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The study comprised two experiments that engaged one hundred eighteen
children, divided into three age groups (4-, 6-, & 8-year-olds) in competitive
games with an adult designed to explore advances in children’s theory of mind
(TOM) beyond false-belief mastery. The game paradigms were designed so that
children with an understanding of RAI (the understanding that a social partner
may be observing one’s behavior to gain insight into one’s intentions and that
one can observe the partner’s behavior to gain similar insight – a proposed later
development of TOM) would be more effective competitors than children who
lacked such awareness. It was hypothesized that the skills required to
successfully complete these games are not present in the average preschooler,
but show significant development from ages 4 to 8.
Success in Experiment 1 required children to inhibit information or provide
misinformation. Such abilities are considered in deception studies to be
indicative of a recursive awareness of intentionality. Age trends were evident for
all dependent variables, including success at the task, strategic behaviors, and

interview data. Four-year-olds were non-strategic and rarely successful, sixyear-olds showed increased flexibility in their strategic behavior and were more
successful, and eight-year-olds were significantly more flexible and subtle in their
strategies, more successful at the task, and more likely to verbalize a recursive
awareness of intention than the younger age groups.
Success in Experiment 2 required children use the behavioral cues of their
opponent to guide their choices during the game. Such ability indicates
awareness of the informative potential of nonverbal signals to infer the hidden
intentions of a partner. Age trends emerged in children’s ability to detect signals
that reveal information about their partner’s intentions. Eight-year-olds
demonstrated significantly more awareness of the informative value of behavioral
cues given by social partners than 4- and 6-year-olds and were significantly more
successful at the task. Findings from both experiments suggest that there are
aspects of TOM that continue to develop across middle childhood.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

Focus of Research
The focus of this research is to determine when children use an
understanding of the intentions of others to influence and make predictions about
a partner‘s future behavior. In particular we seek to understand the emergence of
a recursive awareness of intention (RAI) as a result of unfolding verbal and
nonverbal cues in a social interaction. Understanding intentionality involves the
ability to perceive a partner‘s actual intent, regardless of stated objectives, and
this ability is a crucial component of a child‘s mature theory of mind (TOM). To
successfully interact in a competitive context one must be able to: recognize that
others‘ have goals that may differ from one‘s own, decode and interpret
intentions, detect contingencies between verbal and nonverbal behavior and
ultimate actions, and regulate expressive displays with respect to one‘s goals.
Historically, TOM research culminates with the preschoolers‘ mastery of
the false-belief task (Fodor, 1992; Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990). We argue,
however, that false-belief ability is merely one building block in acquiring a
mature TOM. Thus, our primary goal is to investigate what abilities continue to
develop after age four. Naturalistic observation of social behavior reveals that
the ability to detect social contingencies and the awareness of the intentions of
others and of another‘s corresponding desire to gain access to one‘s own
intentions (recursive awareness) are not fully functional in the average
preschooler. Therefore, we have developed a paradigm to examine
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developmental changes in children‘s ability to detect and use contingencies to
predict a partner‘s intentions in a game situation. Using this contingency
detection paradigm, the current study will attempt to document at what age
children acquire the abilities of contingency detection as it relates to a functional
awareness of intentionality.
Introduction to Theory of Mind
Since Premack and Woodruff‘s (1978) study, which first introduced the
phrase ‗Theory of Mind,‘ there has been a great deal of research concerning the
development of the understanding of mental states such as beliefs, intentions,
desires, and emotions. The development of TOM is notably a lengthy process
with advances in the understanding of mental states being reported from infancy
to adulthood. Thus far, the majority of TOM research has concentrated on the
accumulation of abilities that give rise to the understanding of false-belief
between the ages of 3-5. This analysis will begin by reviewing the current
understanding of TOM development that culminates in this false-belief
understanding around age 4. Then, it will review what is currently known about
development of TOM after age 4. Finally, it will introduce our current paradigm
that attempts to achieve a fuller understanding of TOM development beyond
false-belief mastery.
Hundreds of studies over the last 30 years have thoroughly explored the
development of a young child‘s TOM before the age of four. TOM, also known
as ―mind-reading‖ (Baron-Cohen, 2005), is the understanding that other people
have alternative representations of the world, which may be true or false, and
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which may differ from one‘s own. The concept of TOM provides a cohesive
conceptual framework for research on cognitive and social development.
However, researchers‘ emphasis on children only up through 4 years of age has
led to an arguable deficit in the developmental literature (Lillard, 1999). A
decisive shift in cognitive ability seems to emerge at age 4, and therefore
researchers have been prone to treating TOM as a pass/fail phenomenon rather
than as a continuously emerging skill. Researchers repeatedly conclude that at
preschool age there is a qualitative shift and children newly demonstrate abilities
of perspective taking, false-belief understanding, and appearance-reality
distinctions. Strikingly absent in the literature is what happens after this
developmental shift occurs. Researchers appear to lump 4- and 5-year-olds in
with adults, ignoring the vast qualitative difference between the abilities of a child
and an adult. A typical claim is: ―finally, at about age 4, children begin to
understand that what people think and believe, as well as what they desire,
crucially affects how they behave. That is, they acquire our adult belief-desire
psychology...‖ (Flavell, 1999, p.25, emphasis added).
Through monitoring of facial expression, body language, and a recursive
awareness of intentionality (RAI) (knowledge that their actions will influence the
actions of others, e.g., in a chess match or poker game, players must be aware
that the opponent is trying to infer their intentions – and that they may be able to
infer the intentions of the opponent – based on their behavior), adults can
frequently predict others‘ strategies and intentions and recognize potential deceit.
What we do not know is when and how this more advanced awareness of
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intentionality develops. What cues do children use to detect intentionality? What
is the developmental sequence? Prerequisite skills for understanding of
intentionality rely on many cognitive skills including contingency detection, an
attentiveness to nonverbal social signals, a predilection to attend to faces, and an
awareness of false-belief. Though many of these skills may be apparent
practically from birth, their development continues into adolescence, as will be
outlined in the following review.
Development of TOM up to 4 years of age has been demonstrated to be
universal with achievements occurring at similar rates and in a similar sequence
intra- and interculturally. Diverse cultures exhibit children passing false-belief
paradigms at the same age and this achievement is always preceded by a beliefdesire psychology and followed by appearance-reality understanding.
Intraculturally, such as in groups of deaf, blind, or autistic children, rates of
development are not always the same, but again the sequence of development
remains consistent (Baron-Cohen, 2005; Wellman, 1990; Workman & Reader,
2004). TOM understanding has also been empirically demonstrated to be a
gradual accumulation of advances in performance rather than a discontinuous
process and seems child-driven – relatively independent of adult feedback
(Flynn, 2006). Children have made much progress from their strictly egocentric
frame of mind, but we argue that this is not the end of the story.
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Development of Theory of Mind from birth to 4 years of age
From birth, infants demonstrate a wide range of abilities that serve as
building blocks for a mature TOM. Many abilities are immediately apparent and
others quickly emerge within the first few weeks of life. Infants arguably come
pre-wired to be active social partners even before they have the cognitive
development to support such interactions. They have visual and auditory
preferences as well as automatic reflexes that integrate them into the social
world and serve to ensure adequate care. Visual preferences include a
preference for curved lines, high contrasts, moderate complexity, and movement
– all features that are represented in the human face. They also can see best
from 7-15‖, about the distance to the caregiver‘s face when being held or during
feeding. They prefer higher pitched voices, especially their own mother‘s, and
they show a strong ability to learn contingencies. Bakti, Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Connellan, and Ahluwalia (2000) have empirically demonstrated
that within the first few days infants prefer to look at faces with open eyes rather
than with closed eyes (see also Pellicano & Rhodes, 2003). Within this same
timeframe, they demonstrate reflexive facial imitation behaviors, showing they
are attentive to the faces of others (Meltzoff & Moore, 1989). These natural
preferences provide the infants with the necessary predilections that allow them
to become active social partners.
Infants are quickly able to detect contingencies in the physical
environment, as demonstrated by early experiments by Rovee and Rovee (1969)
and Flavell (1985) (see also Millar & Weir, 1992). In such experiments, infants
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who can control a mobile by kicking their leg quickly learn to do so,
demonstrating that they have an ―understanding‖ that they can affect the physical
world. In more resent research, Lohaus et al. (2005) have demonstrated that
infants who have more sensitive caregivers (characterized by more immediate
response to infant‘s distress) more quickly learn contingency tasks such as the
mobile task or a picture task. Also, infants whose relationships are not marked
by contingent care show more irritability throughout infancy (Lemelin, Tarabulsky,
& Provost, 2002).
Building upon these early contingency-detection abilities in the physical
world, infants soon demonstrate expectations in the social realm. These
expectations are shown by experiments such as the still-face paradigm (Rochat,
2001). Furthermore, by 3 months infants discriminate facial and vocal
expressions, and are sensitive to adult gaze shift (Batki et al., 2000; Hood,
Willen, & Driver, 1998). By 6 months they can follow adult gaze when it is paired
with head orientation (Batki et al., 2000). In the first year of life, infants recognize
the intentionality of emotional states, which they demonstrate through social
referencing. Not only can they discriminate between different facial expressions,
but also they are able to respond appropriately to the face-value emotional
significance of the expression (Harris, 1993).
Later in the first year, as cognitive development continues, infant reflexive
behaviors become more subject to effortful control. Infants continue to attend to
eye gaze and they have been shown to be sensitive to adult gaze shift, looking to
a target more quickly if it was previously cued by adult gaze (Hood et al., 1998).
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They also prefer to look at and engage adults who imitate them (Meltzoff &
Moore, 1989). As an attachment bond forms with a primary caregiver (generally
the mother), the infant uses the relationship to its fullest advantage and uses
mom‘s facial expressions as a guide to reading the outside world. They can
follow gaze, demonstrate imitative learning, and use communicative gestures.
The first year can be essentially characterized by the infants learning that others
around them are intentional agents (Baron-Cohen, 2005; Leslie & Keeble, 1987).
From birth, infants exhibit an innate learning mechanism as well as the ability to
direct their own attention to maximally capitalize on environmental stimuli.
During the second year of life, development continues to proceed at this
remarkable rate. Attachment to a primary caregiver has given the child a reliable
source of information and children actively use it to socially reference, learn
about the environment, communicate, learn perspective taking, and infer
intentions. Early in the second year toddlers use eye gaze to establish joint
attention and they use the face more than any other cue as they interact in the
social world. When confronted with novel toys or the visual cliff paradigm, they
look to the mother‘s face and then base their actions upon her expression. If she
shows fear, they avoid the toys or the cliff, but if she shows positive, encouraging
expressions, they are significantly more likely to approach the stimuli (Klinnert,
1984). From 12-18 months they respond with appropriate affect, show social
referencing, and can follow eye gaze alone (Klinnert, 1984; Nelson, 1987). From
18-24 months they use eye gaze or pointing cues alone. Furthermore, during
this 2nd year, toddlers attempt to influence others‘ moods. For example, they
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show deliberate efforts to upset or tease others or step between warring parents
(Harris, 1993).
Also during this second year, toddlers begin to show understanding that
others have a different perspective than their own. Carpenter, Call, and
Tomasello (2002) demonstrated this in a study where toddlers played with two
toys with two experimenters. One of the experimenters left the room and a third
toy was introduced. When the second experimenter returned later, she
exclaimed ―Wow, look at that one, can you give it to me?‖ without indicating a
specific toy. All children brought her the third toy, demonstrating their awareness
that it would be the most likely to have elicited her interested response. Children
at this age can also infer an adult‘s intentions even if their actions do not go to
completion and they can copy their intended act, rather than the accidental
outcome (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1993).
Year 3 brings the development of children‘s awareness of other‘s mental
states (Wellman, 1990). They are learning about emotions, intentions, and
contingency, all of which are precursors to false-belief understanding. They
begin to make inferences about mental states, such as desires, based on eyegaze, as demonstrated by tasks like Charlie and the Four Sweets. This task
asks the child to predict which candy Charlie (a transparent sheet with a drawing
of a face on it) wants. If the child chooses the candy that Charlie is looking at,
essentially inferring his desires based on his eye gaze, then they are considered
to pass the task. Children of this age also understand that desires can affect
actions (Wellman‘s belief-desire psychology). For example, at around 3 years of

8

age, belief-desire tasks demonstrate that children can understand and predict
other‘s actions based on other‘s desires. An average three-year-old can
successfully predict that another child who has been described as liking kittens
and desiring a kitten may choose a kitten for her birthday present. In other words,
3-year-olds can predict behavior and beliefs of another based on reported
desires. Furthermore, 3-year-olds begin to assume that emotional experience is
a result of the fit between a desire and an outcome. They begin to understand
that others will be happy if they get what they want and sad if they do not (Harris,
1993).
At 3 years of age, children (especially girls) begin to understand some
aspects of emotional display rules, correctly identifying when it would and would
not be appropriate to express certain emotions in response to vignettes
(Banerjee, 1997). Though this is a big step in development towards TOM
understanding and demonstrates that three-year-olds are beginning to grasp
social norms, including display rules, much of the research with this age group
serves to outline what they cannot yet do. For example, three-year-olds may be
able to identify when it is not appropriate to display an emotion but their ability to
actually suppress an emotional display may still be lacking. Also, they may be
able to engage in deception when specifically instructed, but do not demonstrate
an understanding of how deceptive acts would affect another‘s perception (Hala,
Chandler, & Fritz, 1991). In general, research to date shows that 3-year-olds
have a lexical bias (Freire, Eskritt, & Lee, 2004) and are driven by salience rather
than subtlety (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998).
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In 2004, Freire et al. developed a paradigm to examine children‘s
tendency to use eye gaze as an informative clue in cooperative and deceptive
situations. In this series of experiments, children watched videos where an actor
hid a toy in one of three cups. In varying conditions, the actor claimed to know
the location of the toy while looking towards one of the cups, claimed ignorance
to the location of the toy while looking towards one of the cups or provided
contradictory verbal and eye gaze clues about the location of the toy. Threeyear-olds were able to use eye gaze cues in cooperative situations (e.g., when
the actor looked toward a cup while saying ―the toy is there‖) but did not seem to
garner any significance from it during deceptive situations (e.g., when the actor
looked toward a cup while saying ―I don‘t know where the toy is‖). Furthermore,
in contradictory conditions, three-year-olds relied on verbal cues despite
repeated failure. They seem to have no appreciation for conflicting goals and do
not engage in recursive thought. Though they are tuned into nonverbal cues
they are unable to use them (in a similar manner that apes can follow pointing
but do not seem to garner the mentalistic, attention-directing significance of such
an act). Three-year-olds are unable to distinguish between know and guess,
applying equal weight to both when given clues (Miscione, Marvin, & O'Brien,
1978). At 2-3 years toddlers can use eye gaze to infer mental states such as
desires and thinking but only in cooperative situations (Freire, Eskritt, & Lee,
2004, see also Lee, Eskritt, Symons, & Muir, 1998). It is not until 4-5 years of age
that children are sensitive to duration and frequency of eye-gaze when
attempting to make further inferences about mental states (Freire et al., 2004).
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While year 3 is characterized in the literature by what children are yet
unable to do, year 4 brings with it an explosion of what children can do. Around
the fourth year of life, children cross a threshold and begin to pass false-belief
tasks (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), demonstrating that they are now aware that
others can have beliefs that are different than their own and that these beliefs
can be correct or incorrect. At age 4, false-belief tasks predict that children
develop the understanding that others may have a different perspective than their
own. False-belief understanding has been examined using such paradigms as
the Sally-Ann Task. Versions of this task use two puppets, two baskets, and a
marble. One puppet, Sally, hides the marble in one of the baskets and then
leaves. Then, Ann moves the marble to the other basket in full view of the child.
The child is then asked where Sally will look for the marble upon her return.
Children who have not yet achieved false-belief understanding will predict that
Sally will look in the new location, conferring their own knowledge upon her.
Children who have achieved false-belief understanding, however, recognize that
Sally‘s beliefs may differ from their own and that she is not privy to the
knowledge that the marble has been moved, and thus she will look in the original
location. Children begin to make this distinction around the age of 4 and it is a
primary indication that they are beginning to develop TOM.
Appearance-Reality (A-R) distinctions also come on-line around the age of
4. A-R distinctions involve the ability to understand that appearance can be
misleading (Woolley & Wellman, 1990). Children can be shown a sponge that is
shaped like a rock and then asked what it is. Children who have not achieved A-
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R understanding are likely to be misled by appearances and are unable to label
the rock as a sponge even upon closer examination. Children who have not yet
achieved the ability to make these distinctions are also likely to assert that white
milk that has been covered by a green filter has, in fact, turned green. They will
avow that if they were to look behind the filter or if the filter were to be removed
the milk would remain green. Older children, who have achieved A-R
understanding, are able to express that the milk only appears to be green, but in
reality, the milk is still white (Flavell, 1985).
One of the key implications and extensions of achieving this A-R
understanding is the awareness that expressive behaviors may not always match
inner feelings (Flavell, 2000). This awareness is key for social intelligence and
must be realized to be a strategically interactive partner in the social world.
Achieving the ability to distinguish appearance from reality allows for emotional
dissemblance (the ability to hide or conceal one‘s true motives, feelings, or
beliefs), is required to use cultural display rules (modification of facial expression
to meet social expectations) (Ekman & Friesen, 1971), and allows for tactical
deception (the ability to misrepresent your intentions to attain strategic advantage
in a competitive situation). However, to successfully use tactical deception and
decipher displays, one must be able to predict the intentions behind the
behaviors of others. Though this understanding is crucial to be a competent
opponent in the social world, it is important to note that such an understanding is
very fragile at this age and continues to develop well into late childhood and
adolescence.
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By 4 years of age, children are aware that others have unique thoughts
and beliefs, but they are still unskilled at causing false beliefs through deception
or trickery. As demonstrated in LaFreniere‘s (1988) hide-the-bear task where
children were asked to hide a stuffed bear in one of three locations and to not
divulge the location to a ‗hunter‘, 4-year-old children demonstrated an attempt to
suppress information about the bear‘s location, but they were still unable to stifle
telling cues, such as eye gaze, orientation, or other actions (e.g., giggles),
remaining rather oblivious to what cues a social opponent would use.
Baron-Cohen (2005) summarizes the development of skills leading to
TOM development in his 1994 model of mindreading (see Figure 1):

The Emotion
Emotion Detector
Detector
The
TED
TED
0-9 Months
Months
0-9

Detector
Intentionality Detector
ID
0-9 Months
Months
0-9

Direction Detector
Detector
Eye Direction
EDD
0-9 Months
Months
0-9

Shared Attention Module
Shared
SAM
9-14 months
months
9-14
The Empathizing
Empathizing System
The
TESS
TESS
14 months
months
14

Theory of
of Mind
Mind
Theory
TOM
TOM
48 months

Figure 1. Baron-Cohen‘s Model of TOM Development
From 0-9 months, Baron-Cohen‘s model proposes The Emotion Detector
(i.e., discrimination of basic emotions), the Intentionality Detector (i.e., basic
understanding that actions have goals), and an Eye Direction Detector (i.e.,
ability to use eye gaze). At 9 months, these skills are coordinated and feed into a
Shared Attention Mechanism that allows for organized joint attention between the
child and another. At 14 months, The Empathizing System keys into detecting
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emotional states and allows for appropriate empathetic reactions to another‘s
emotional state. And, finally, the TOM mechanism, as discussed earlier, is
proposed to be evident at 4 years of age.
According to this time-line of development, by 4 years of age, children
should have all the skills necessary to infer others‘ intentions. According to the
five postulates set forth by previous research, children now understand that ―the
mind (1) exists, (2) has connections to the physical world, (3) is separate from
and differs from the physical world, (4) can represent objects and events
accurately or inaccurately, and (5) actively mediates the interpretation of reality
and the emotion experienced‖ (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1993, p.101). With these
achievements, year 4 seems to be held as the pinnacle of development in TOM
circles, but even a naïve observer can see that the mind-reading abilities of a 4year-old are very different than those of an adult. Certainly there are further
developments that lie under the surface yet to be explored. Just as cognitive
development is not completed at the preschool age even with advances in
memory and attention, understanding of the social world is similarly
underdeveloped. Researchers who implicitly claim that TOM is complete at the
preschool age neglect developments in abilities that continue to accrue over
middle childhood. For example, as demonstrated by several researchers, RAI, or
the understanding that the cues one provides will influence the beliefs and
actions of those receiving them, is virtually absent in children younger than age
5. ―In fact, understanding recursive thought would be a good candidate for a sixth
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postulate for a TOM in late childhood or early adolescence‖ (Flavell, Miller, &
Miller 1993, p. 218).
Development of Theory of Mind beyond 4 years of age
Some research has attempted to bridge the gap between the abilities of
an older child/adult and those of a preschooler. Emotional understanding has
been laid out on an 11-year time-line ranging from the mere recognition of
emotions to understanding moral emotions (Pons & Harris, 2005; Pons, Harris, &
DeRosnay, 2004). Tactical deception and recursive awareness abilities have
been investigated throughout the first 8 years (LaFreniere, 1988; Schultz &
Cloghesy, 1981). Research with deaf, blind, and autistic children, furthermore,
examines TOM development into later childhood. Investigation into what skills
children use to detect intention, infer truth, and mislead others is beginning to
emerge as well. For example, research has examined when children begin to use
nonverbal signals to interpret behavior and when children can use nonverbal
signals to mislead others. Freire, Eskritt, and Lee (2004) found that in a
deceptive task, 5-year-olds interpreted eye gaze as more informative and
revealing than a misleading verbal cue. Three-year-olds, though able to detect
and follow the experimenter‘s gaze, as demonstrated in a cooperative task, were
more likely to rely on verbal information rather than the referential and more
truthful eye-gaze cue when the two were in opposition. Thus, it seems that 4-5year-olds are starting to attend to informative nonverbal cues to read the
intentions of others in deceptive situations while 3-years-olds are not yet savvy
enough to read underlying intentions to behavior. So, though children can follow
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eye gaze and detect contingencies from infancy, achieve joint attention by 12
months, and infer mental states by 3 years, they are still unable to successfully
decode signals when confronted with deceptive information. By 5 years of age,
however, children are beginning to use eye gaze cues to infer intentions, even in
the presence of contradictory verbal cues. This study demonstrates that ability to
detect intentions has begun in the preschool years though ―the detection of
deception from such cues may emerge beyond the preschool years and develop
well into adolescence‖ (Freire et al., 2004, p. 1102).
After 4 years of age we continue to see increases in not only TOM, but
also perspective taking (a skill many adults still need to hone), recursive
awareness (which probably epitomizes the adolescent social circle),
interpersonal skills, goals, strategies, understanding of the implications of the
actions of others, and appearance-reality differences. Around 5-6 years of age,
those skills that were demonstrated as a 4-year-old are solidifying and becoming
less fragile. Certainly helped along by ever increasing language skills and social
experience, children are beginning to be able to make appearance-reality
distinctions not only in the physical world but also in the emotional world. They
begin to recognize discrepancy between real and displayed emotion and are able
to enact cultural display rules in more arousing situations (Pons, Harris, &
DeRosnay, 2004). They are also becoming aware of tactical deception
strategies, even if they are not able to successfully carry them out. In
LaFreniere‘s (1988) hide-the-bear task, 5-6-year-olds were more able to control
and inhibit nonverbal cues, though they still did not generally spontaneously
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produce misleading cues, thereby demonstrating a continued lack of mature
recursive awareness. In a card-playing paradigm that will be discussed more
fully later, Shultz and Cloghesy (1981) required children to be receptive to and to
initiate strategies to win cards. Though as early as 5 years of age, children
demonstrated a budding awareness of deceptive strategies, they were better at
retaliating against them than producing them. These children are developing
greater cognitive and behavioral control and are on the cusp of being able to
consider multiple factors at the same time.
In Bering and Parker‘s (2006) study examining attribution of intention to an
invisible agent, children were told that an invisible ‗Princess Alice‘ was in the
room and was going to try to help them be successful at a guessing task by
telling them if they pick the wrong box. Children were asked to make decisions
(choosing one of two boxes) and then a hidden examiner used a remote to cause
a lamp to flash or a picture to fall. Though children as young as 5 years of age
identified these occurrences as produced by Princess Alice, they did not use
such antics as informative for their decision-making in the task at hand. Threeyear-olds attributed occurrences to purely physical causes (e.g., the picture must
not have been hung very well). Five-year-olds attributed them to Princess Alice
but did not take them to be signs of her intentionally trying to communicate with
them to help them with their guess. It was not until 7 years of age that children
were able to use such antics as a source of information to help guide their
decisions.
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By adulthood most individuals have a mature TOM and are adept at using
eye gaze, tone, inflection, and other nonverbal cues to garner a fuller
understanding of the intentions behind mere verbal communication. Freire et al.
(2004) assert that adults regularly use eye-gaze to detect and infer deception
and are highly skilled at recursive awareness. It has even been found that eyedirection is so salient that it triggers automatic shifts in visual attention, even
when participants are instructed to ignore it or when it is a detriment to
performance (Posner, 1980). Adults have come a long way in their social
abilities, helped along by cognitive development and social experience. It is
apparent that progress takes place, but more research is needed to fully
understand how and when changes occur.
The development of a child‘s ability to detect signals of intention,
especially those that indicate purposefully misleading intentions, is only half of
the story. As social participants, children also have the opportunity to produce
their own misleading intentional cues to achieve their own social goals. This
ability of tactical deception begins to emerge around the preschool age and can
be seen in children‘s attempts to trick their peers, avoid punishment, acquire
more time to play, etc. Tactical deception, or the ability to purposefully conceal
one‘s intentions, misrepresent one‘s intentions, or successfully read the
intentions of others lays a foundation for securing strategic advantage during an
adversarial encounter in the social world and is a key to the development of
social intelligence.
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Between 5-6 years of age, children demonstrate the ability to use
nonverbal cues to infer intentions even in light of contradictory verbal cues.
However, they are unable to use this understanding to successfully mislead an
adult who was trying to detect deception. In Feldman, Jenkins, and Popoola‘s
(1979) study, children were asked to pretend they liked a drink, regardless of
whether it tasted good or bad and then adults were asked to determine which
drinks the children actually liked and which they were only pretending to like.
First graders were generally unsuccessful at covering up their negative opinion of
the drink when judged by adults. Seventh graders were more able to cover up
their negative opinion, though they were more likely to inhibit any response,
whereas college students were also able to deceive judges, though their
strategies generally involved producing an alternative expressive response rather
than merely inhibiting the true response. Therefore, it appears that deception
strategies evolve from mere inhibition of expressive cues to increasingly
deceptive production of alternate expressions to enhance deceptive displays.
In a task examining tactical deception in which children were instructed to
hide a small bear from a ―hunter‖, LaFreniere (1988) found that children younger
than 4 were always unsuccessful in attempts to fool the adult when asked about
the bear‘s location. Furthermore, five and six-year-olds were only very
occasionally successful. It wasn‘t until 8 years of age that children could use
tactical deception to fool an adult significantly more often. The youngest group
attempted to inhibit information, but leaked clues by glancing at the bear‘s
location, using a predictable hiding strategy, or telling the adult where the bear
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was. Five- and 6-year-olds were more successful at inhibiting information but not
yet skilled at conveying false information in a stimulating situation. Eight-yearolds not only were more successful in inhibiting information, but they were the
only group that also produced information to suggest false intentions. This
production of false cues demonstrates an ability of recursive awareness — that
the cues one provides will influence the beliefs and actions of those receiving
them. To successfully use recursive awareness, one must not only realize what
cues an opponent will use to infer intention, but also must modify such cues in a
convincing manner.
Schultz and Cloghesy (1981) designed a study that looked at children‘s
ability to perceive intentions as well as their ability to produce successful
misleading intentional cues. These researchers developed a guessing game
paradigm to investigate when awareness of intentionality develops. The game
provided a ―situation where it was advantageous for the child to engage in
strategic actions‖ (Schultz & Cloghesy, 1981, p.466) to win the game. In the
game, one player attempted to guess the color of the next card in a regular deck
of playing cards based upon a hint given by the other player. In some conditions
the examiner gave hints and in others, the child provided the hint. The examiner
would always start by playing straight (pointing to the correct card or guessing
the card the child pointed to) and after the child won four straight cards, he would
switch to the deceptive strategy. To be successful, children needed to
strategically disguise their intentions by pointing to the incorrect cards, guessing
the color opposite to that pointed to by the examiner, and switching strategies
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when appropriate. These actions would reveal that the child knew that the
examiner was attempting to gain access to the child‘s intentions and that they
needed to change their behavior to compete effectively. They found that such
recursive strategies are sometimes employed by 5-year-olds but never by 3-yearolds and performance continued to improve from ages 7 to 9. It was also found
that ―children appeared to be better at retaliating against deceptive strategies
than at initiating them‖ (Schultz & Cloghesy, 1981, p.465).
Based upon the paradigm developed by Schultz and Cloghesy (1981),
LaFreniere (1988) developed a modified version of this game to examine how
well children can use contingent expressive cues to detect ongoing deception.
Children from 4–8 were instructed to guess the color of the next card based on
the cues provided by the examiner. However, in this modification, the
truthfulness of the cue was contingent upon the facial expression of the examiner
providing it. In one condition, the experimenter would smile whenever giving a
false clue and keep a poker face when giving an honest clue. These facial cues
were reversed in the second condition. As expected, preschoolers were rarely
successful in solving any condition of the contingency task, taking any cue as an
honest signal. Older children solved the contingency more frequently, with 50%
scoring above chance. Interestingly, there was a significant effect of condition for
the older group. Three times as many children solved the problem when
deception was paired with a smile than when paired with a neutral expression.
They interpreted the ―sneaky grin‖ on the examiner‘s face as linked to on-going
deception. These results beg the question of what nonverbal signals children
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use to detect intentionality (are some cues more illustrative than others?) and
what signals do they use or attempt to suppress in order to influence the
behavior of others? We will attempt to find answers to both questions as we
seek to investigate the development of recursive awareness in the current study.
Recursive awareness provides the first indication that children are actively
engaged in the thought processes of others and are aware of how their own
responses can be used and manipulated by themselves and by social partners.
Reviewed research shows that from age 7–9 children show an increase in
recursive awareness abilities and are finally able to more productively use
strategies to manipulate competitive social exchanges. In Shultz and Cloghesy‘s
(1981) card playing paradigm, these 7–9-year-olds were able to use recursive
strategies to win cards, to mislead, and to preemptively strike against the adult
examiner. These children were also savvier at using tactical deception
strategies. In LaFreniere‘s (1988) hide-the-bear task, not only could they inhibit
leading nonverbal cues, but also they could produce deceptive cues to actively
mislead their opponent, clearly demonstrating their grasp on what cues their
opponent was relying on to make predictions.
Though skills increase from 7–9 years of age, it is not until around year 11
that social understanding becomes increasingly more adult-like. At this age
children not only can engage in recursive strategies but also can verbally discuss
strategies and demonstrate an awareness of how their actions may be perceived
by another (Schultz & Cloghesy, 1981). Around this point in maturation, these
children also begin to demonstrate right hemisphere dominant activation during
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TOM and emotional understanding tasks, similar to an adult (Workman, Chilvers,
Yeomans, & Taylor, 2006). Such specialization may be necessary to fully
develop social awareness, social cognition, and true recursive awareness. This
evidence supports Flavell, Miller, and Miller‘s (1993) assertion that the
development of recursive awareness may reflect TOM development in
adolescence.
True recursive awareness is a developmental step beyond basic TOM
understanding, when TOM is characterized by false-belief mastery. For
recursive awareness, not only must children have an awareness of the beliefs
and thoughts of another, but they also must have a conception that the other has
a similar awareness of their own thoughts. So, not only must children be capable
of taking into account their partner‘s perspective, but also children must be
capable of taking into account their partner-taking-into-account-the-child‘s
perspective. In this manner, it logically follows that children would be able to
produce misleading intentional cues (by merely taking into account what their
partner will believe) before they will be able to decode such cues from another
(which would require taking into account the partner-taking-into-account the
child‘s own beliefs) (LaFreniere, 2000). Such recursion quickly becomes
convoluted (I think that he thinks that I think that he will think that I…), yet in dayto-day encounters adults routinely decode elaborate intentions through appraisal
of verbal and nonverbal signals as they navigate the social world. Such ability is
the culmination of many prior developments. Understanding physical and social
contingencies, facial expressions, verbal and nonverbal cues, underlying
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intentions, TOM, and the implications of different behaviors within a specific
social context are the prerequisites for the recursive behavior that is ubiquitous in
human culture. A four-year-old‘s basic understanding of false-belief is very
lacking in revealing a mature social understanding. Based on this, there is a call
for examination of later developments before we can claim to truly understand
the development of social intelligence.
One of the obstacles in studying TOM is that it is a uniquely human trait.
Though extensive time and effort has been put into investigating whether or not
chimpanzees have a TOM (Povenelli & Eddy, 1996; Premack & Woodruff, 1978;
Tomasello & Call, 1997; see also Call & Tomasello, 2008), to date the general
consensus remains that chimpanzees have a behavioristic rather than mentalistic
concept of others, (i.e., chimpanzees learn and respond to the outward behavior
of others without making attributions about underlying mental motivations and
intentions). Therefore, study must be relegated to humans only and to the ethical
bounds inherent to such study. We can garner some insight into functioning
without TOM through examination of populations where it is hypothesized to be
limited or absent (e.g, as in cases of autism) (Campbell et al., 2006) or by looking
to cases where it is thought to be enhanced, at least when measured by mental
age (William‘s syndrome). Other examinations of TOM and its development and
implications rely on creative methodology and careful control.
Naturalistic observation of preschoolers has revealed that children begin
to use egocentric (and unsuccessful) deception attempts as a means of avoiding
trouble, maintaining social cohesion, and achieving social goals very early on in
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life (LaFreniere, 1988). These observations of children‘s naturally occurring
behavior in situ, while illuminating in some respects, have led to an accumulation
of inconclusive anecdotes that do not permit firm inferences about the cognitive
abilities of children at different ages (Byrne & Whiten, 1988). Both
developmental psychologists and primatologists have questioned whether the
basis of behavior is anything more than mere behavioral conditioning (Povinelli &
Eddy, 1996). Therefore, the current study uses classical experimental methods
to examine children‘s mentalistic understanding of mental states at different
ages. A game-playing situation is used during which children‘s natural
competitive strategies can be observed as well as their ability to perceive the
strategies of the examiner who ―leaks‖ telltale signs of hidden intentions (i.e.,
glancing and smiling behavior).
Development can be conceptualized as the convergence of evolved
adaptations, biological propensities, individual characteristics, and sociocultural
experiences. Study has already shown that TOM development is impacted by
biological propensities (e.g., through behavioral genetics research (Iarocci,
Yager, & Elfers, 2007) and through cross cultural research demonstrating similar
developmental timelines and sequences through different cultures) (Liu,
Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008), and sociocultural experiences (e.g., a large
family or experience with parents, siblings and peers) (Hughes, Jaffee, Happe,
Taylor, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2005). As cognitive development progresses and
individuals are able to consider multiple perspectives, it is necessary to look at
individual differences that impact TOM development at older, more socially
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functional levels. Although TOM can be studied through deception tasks, in the
social world it also functions to increase social cohesiveness, communication,
perspective taking, and to facilitate the accomplishment of goals. Understanding
of the individual characteristics and abilities that lead people to excel in such
areas could have positive implications for training programs and supported
development. Important aspects to consider would be one‘s ability to react
selectively to unique individuals, situations, and in different types of relationships.
One must also have active coping strategies to regulate arousal in
confrontational situations, and one must monitor and control behavior to fit the
ever-changing situation. Finally, to be able to respond and act persuasively, one
must have the belief in his/her own self-efficacy of manipulating the actions and
thoughts of others. Examination of characteristics, strategies, and goals of such
individuals would illuminate what TOM characteristics are necessary to develop
to be exceptionally influential.
Diplomacy, persuasion, and empathy, as well as deception, all rely on
having the ability to sensitively understand and take into consideration the
perspective of those around you — whether it be peers in a preschool classroom,
crowds in adolescence, romantic partners in adulthood, co-workers in an office,
or different cultural, racial, or religious groups around the world. While the
heralded false-belief understanding demonstrated in a puppet-task by a 4-yearold marks the beginning of the development of such skills, there is a long road
that must be traveled before a child can successfully navigate the broader human
world. How and when these skills are achieved and in what situations such skills
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are applied or neglected will determine how successfully one can interact in a
complex social environment.
Recent research shows that a mature understanding of the social world is
not present with acquisition of TOM as historically conceptualized. Further
research plotting the development of recursive awareness is vital. Therefore, the
current study seeks to determine developmental differences between encoding
and decoding signals that reveal intention, to assess the age when children can
use contingent facial expressions to detect intentions, to examine if different
facial expressions facilitate or hinder understanding of intentions, to observe
whether children learn some contingencies earlier than others, and to assess
when and by means a child may seek to influence the beliefs of others.
The Present Study’s Basic Design
In the present study, we proposed that recursive awareness of
intentionality (RAI) is not present during young childhood, even after the age of
traditional false-belief mastery. Using a modified version of Schultz and
Cloghesy‘s (1981) card playing paradigm, three age groups were given the
opportunity to use an understanding of RAI (the understanding that the partner is
observing one‘s behavior in an attempt to gain insight into one‘s intentions and
that one can observe the partner‘s behavior to gain similar insight) to compete
more effectively in competitive game situations. The original game (1981) was
modified to allow the children to attempt to control a situation in which a RAI
would make them more effective competitors. We are primarily interested in
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developmental differences; therefore, hypotheses were formulated with respect
to age. No sex differences were predicted for this experiment.
The present study engaged 4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds in a guessing game
paradigm designed to examine age differences in children‘s ability to influence
and respond to the behavior of an adult partner. The game was played with a
deck of cards turned face down. In Experiment 1, children were asked to look at
the top card in the deck and then the examiner would attempt to guess its color
based on a pointing cue from the child as well as by observing any nonverbal (or
verbal) clues that the child emitted (e.g., eye-gaze, head orientation,
verbalization of card color). Success required that the child be able to identify
and suppress behaviors that would reveal information to the adult as well as to
potentially provide false cues to mislead the examiner. In Experiment 2, the
situation was reversed. Children were asked to guess the color of the card
based on a hint by the adult. In Experiment 2, the veracity of the adult‘s hints was
contingent upon her facial expression. Success required that children be able to
recognize the informative value of the nonverbal behavior to make accurate
choices throughout the trials. Experiment 1 will be reported in its entirety and
then Experiment 2 will be presented. Finally a general discussion integrating the
findings will conclude the thesis.
Experiment 1
Dependent Variables
Children were rated on how many cards they won during the game.
Coders also rated the children‘s behaviors on a series of behavioral categories
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(explicit revelation, accidental revelation, salient hiding attempts, false
information and number of changes in pointing strategy). Children were also
categorized based on follow-up interview data that were organized to verbally
assess their level of RAI.
Developmental Hypotheses
According to previous research there are systematic developmental
advances in young children‘s deployment of tactical strategies to win a
competitive game paradigm, with predominant strategies characteristic of each of
the age groups examined (LaFreniere, 1988; Schultz & Cloghesy, 1981). We
believe that advances result from an emerging understanding of RAI (the
understanding that the partner is observing one‘s behavior in an attempt to gain
insight into one‘s intentions and that one can observe the partner‘s behavior to
gain similar insight). The current paradigm was created based on this previous
research to place children in a scenario where RAI is necessary for successful
completion of the experimental task. Based on the systematic developmental
advances previously found, the following hypotheses were made with respect to
age:

1. Eight-year-olds were predicted to demonstrate a more developed RAI and thus
would be significantly more successful at the current game paradigm than would
6-year-olds, who would be significantly more successful than 4-year-olds.
2. Eight-year-olds were predicted to demonstrate the understanding that their
behavior may provide information to their partner. Eight-year-olds were expected
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to use this understanding to monitor their own behavior enabling them to reveal
significantly less information than six-year-olds, who would reveal significantly
less information than 4-year-olds.
3. Eight-year-olds were predicted to demonstrate an understanding that they can
modify their own behavior to successfully mislead their partner and were
expected to demonstrate more attempts at hiding information than 6-year-olds
who would demonstrate more hiding attempts than 4-year-olds.
4. Eight-year-olds were predicted to actively fabricate false cues to more
effectively mislead their opponent significantly more often than 6-year-olds who
would produce more false cues than 4-year-olds.
5. Eight-year-olds‘ verbal reports during the interview were predicted to
demonstrate a greater understanding of RAI than 6-year-olds who were predicted
demonstrate a more developed understanding than 4-year-olds.
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Chapter II
METHODS EXPERIMENT 1

Experiment 1: Encoding
Participants
One hundred and eighteen predominantly white, middle-class children (36
4-year-olds (M = 52.4 months, SD = 5.8, and range = 41-65), 41 each of 6- (M =
70.3 months, SD = 3.7, and range = 64-77) and 8-year-olds (M = 95.3 months,
SD = 3.8, and range = 89-103)) were recruited from local preschool and
elementary schools (See Table 1). Participants were from predominantly white,
middle- and working-class families living in small Maine communities.

Table 1. Age and Sex of Participants
Age

Males

Females

Total

4-year-olds

22

14

36

6-year-olds

22

19

41

8-year-olds

20

21

41

Total

64

54

118
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Informed Consent
Local superintendents, principals, and teachers were contacted and
invited to participate in a study that would inform us about the development of
children‘s theory of mind (TOM) after age 4. Once classrooms had district
permission to participate, letters were sent home to parents informing them about
the nature of the study and asking for their permission for their children to
participate. Parents were told that children would be videotaped to ensure that
behaviors could be coded later, and that videotapes would remain confidential.
Parents were asked to sign an informed consent form that described the nature
of the study (see Appendix A). In addition, each child was invited to participate at
the beginning of the experimental session and was allowed to withdraw at any
time (see Appendix B). Only one child (in the 4-year-old age group) declined to
participate. The child agreed to accompany the examiner to the examination
room but then refused to respond to any questions, prompts, or stimuli and thus
was excluded from the analysis.
Materials
A video recorder with a zoom lens was placed unobtrusively in the testing
room and was used to videotape the children‘s behavior. Children were informed
that they were being videotaped and they quickly acclimated to the camera in the
room.
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Procedures
We were interested in when children develop an understanding of
recursive awareness of intention (RAI) and attempt to use this understanding to
influence social interactions. First, children were introduced to a simple guessing
game in order to establish basic ability to detect simple contingencies (see
Appendix B for all instructions given to child). This introductory task not only
provided baseline data, but also served to orient the child to the exam room and
testing stimuli. The task involved two stacks of ordinary playing cards, lying face
down on the table. The child was instructed to guess the color of the next card
(either red or black), alternating between decks. The deck on the right was made
up of all black cards and the deck on the left was all red, creating a simple
contingency paradigm. It was expected that children of all ages would be able to
quickly grasp the contingency between deck position and color and shortly be
able to make accurate predictions. The examiner introduced the task:

This is a guessing game. The game is played with a deck of cards. Each
card is red or black (show the card as the color is named). The game is to
guess the color of the next card in these stacks (point to the two stacks).
What color do you think this card is? What about his one? (Alternate
between decks until the child is able to successfully “guess” the color 6
consecutive times). You did great! Let‘s try the next game!
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Once the child demonstrated the ability to detect the contingency, the
decks were shuffled together and the second part of the Experiment 1 began. For
Part 2 of Experiment 1, children were asked to individually engage in a guessing
game with the examiner using a deck of 20 cards to determine at what age and
by what means a child demonstrates intentions and ability to successfully
mislead others in a competitive situation. The shuffled deck was placed face
down in the center of a table with a red card placed face up to the left of the deck
and a black card face up to the right. The child was asked to look at the next
card in the deck and then point to either the red or the black card as a clue for
the examiner, whose task it was to guess the color of the hidden card. If the
child did not spontaneously point to one of the cards, he/she was reminded to
point to give the examiner a hint. If the examiner guessed correctly she won the
card, if she guessed incorrectly, the child won the card. The object of the game
was to win as many cards as possible. The competitive nature of the game was
stressed to each child. The examiner attempted to guess the color by reading the
child‘s social or nonverbal signals, facial expression, eye gaze, etc. Observation
of the child‘s behaviors, success at deception (quantified as how many cards
he/she won), and responses to a follow-up interview were used to determine
when children develop an awareness of which cues their partner is using to gain
information as well as when children are able to inhibit such cues or to provide
false cues to mislead their partner.
Once the child demonstrated an understanding of his/her role, this second
part of the experiment began. The examiner introduced Part 2:
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Next you get to have a turn looking at the cards and I will try to guess
what the color is! You will look at the card and then point to either the red
card or the black card to give me a hint. If I guess right, then I win the
card. If you trick me and I guess wrong, then you win the card.
Remember; try to win as many cards as you can! Okay?

Trials consisted of 20 cards and interactions were videotaped for later
analysis of the behavior of the child who was playing the role of the clue-giver.
Eye gaze, verbal and nonverbal signals (i.e., consistently orienting towards the
correct/incorrect card), and facial expressions were observed as well as the
child‘s overall success at deception (quantified by how many cards he/she won).
These data determined how able the child was at hiding his/her true intentions
and conveying false ones and provided insight into when and by what means a
child can demonstrate intentions to successfully mislead others. Such ability
indicates a developing recursive awareness where children demonstrate they
understand what cues their opponent may be using to make accurate predictions
as well as the ability to manipulate cues convincingly. The number of cards a
child won was recorded and children were also interviewed following the game to
assess what strategies, if any, that they used to attempt to prevent their
opponent from guessing the correct color (see Interview Template 1, Appendix
C).
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Internal Consistency Reliability for Behavior Coding
After completing all testing, research assistants coded the videotapes for
behaviors that revealed, inhibited, or fabricated information. Three coders met
with the primary examiner weekly to establish a list of target behaviors of interest
and to streamline a rating form to be used with each video. Once all coders were
trained, they coded the first 20 videos independently. Based on these first 20
video ratings, inter-rater reliability checks demonstrated high reliability among all
coders. All raters were significantly correlated, Spearman’s rho = 0.9, p < .001.
Furthermore, cross tabs analysis revealed an average Kappa = .6, p< .001.
Once inter-rater reliability was attained, raters scored the remaining videos
independently. Following these independent ratings, each video was viewed
again as a group and any discrepancies among the three raters‘ scores were
resolved. In this manner a final behavioral record was produced for each child.
(See Appendix D: Coding of Behavior Template; Appendix E: Behavior Coding
Instructions)
Behaviors of interest
Examination of videos of the children‘s performances allowed us to
examine several categories of behaviors that were of special interest as we
attempted to outline differences that may account for the differences in children‘s
success levels at manipulating an adult‘s behavior. We were interested in, 1)
behaviors that revealed information to the examiner, divided into explicit
revelations of information (indicating that the child was not attempting to hide
information) and accidental revelations of information (indicating a lack of
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awareness of what behaviors may be used by a partner and thus need to be
controlled), 2) behavior that demonstrated an attempt to hide information (visible
attempts at suppressing information), and finally, 3) behaviors that were
indicative of fabricating information to actively mislead the opponent, divided into
false cues (attempting to give misinformation to mislead the guesser) and
number of changes in pointing strategy (i.e., pointing sometimes to the correct
color and other times to the incorrect color). Each of these types of behaviors
was of special interest because they each reveal something about the child‘s
level of recursive awareness.
Explicit revelations of information are relatively uninformative because we
cannot conclusively determine the child‘s goals (e.g., Do they understand the
task? Are they motivated to win the cards?). Accidental revelations of
information are more interesting. When the child is actively attempting to mislead
the adult and accidentally gives away information, we can conclude that the child
has an immature understanding of what behavioral cues the adult is using to gain
insight. The presence of visible attempts to hide information is also interesting.
If children make a visible effort to hide possible sources of information from the
adult, they are indicating that they are aware of what behaviors an adult may
draw information from and realize that they have the ability to conceal such cues.
Provision of false information is interesting as well because it demonstrates that
children recognize that their partner is using particular cues to garner information
and the children realize they have the potential to manipulate the adult‘s beliefs.
Finally, the ability to switch flexibly between pointing strategies shows a more
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subtle understanding of what cues the adult is drawing information from.
Research assistants coded all of the videos, summing how many of each type of
behavior was present for each child during Experiment 1
Interview Data
In addition to pass/fail information and behavioral analysis, we also
analyzed the children based on follow-up interview data. Based on verbal
reports elicited by interview questions immediately following the task the
examiner categorized the children into one of three groups: those providing 1) no
indication of RAI (e.g., shrugging, no attempts to influence adult‘s guess in a
strategic manner), 2) incomplete indication of RAI (consistent strategy or inability
to explain strategy, e.g., ―I tried to trick you. I pointed to the wrong one but you
guessed it anyway.‖), or 3) evidence of conclusive understanding of RAI (e.g., ―I
looked at that one so you would think it was that color, but really it was the other
one and I knew you would think I would do that again so I didn‘t.‖). Children in
this final group frequently used vocabulary that revealed insight into the expected
thoughts or expectations of the partner.
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Chapter III
RESULTS EXPERIMENT 1

Analysis Strategy
A number of analytic strategies were used to examine developmental
trends in the dependent variables of primary interest. General Linear Modeling
using a Poisson Regression Analysis, generating chi-square (2) and p-values
was employed to assess age differences for probability of reaching success
criteria as well as to assess age differences in behavioral strategies and verbal
report (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). These values were corrected using the SIDAK
post hoc test, which acts as a protection factor for inflated Type 1 error rates
when examining all pairwise combinations (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2000). The
Poisson Regression Analysis was used because we collected count data that
were non-continuous and we did not expect that the behavioral data would be
distributed normally. This expectation was confirmed when data demonstrated
skew on an exploratory Q-Q plot. Preliminary analyses will be presented first,
followed by analyses specific to each hypothesis set forth by this study.
Analyses of differences by age are of primary interest, though sex differences will
be noted where applicable. For ease of interpretation, figures are predominantly
used throughout the text. For additional tables, see Appendix H.
Simple contingency detection results
All children were able to correctly detect the simple contingency when
asked to guess the color of the next card when stacks were segregated by color.
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This simple preliminary task was continued until a child guessed correctly 6
consecutive times. The majority of children achieved this goal within the first 6-8
cards. The largest number of trials necessary for any child was 10 cards.
Children of all ages were very quick and accurate in identifying the contingency
inherent in the task design.
Sex Differences
Before addressing individual hypotheses that were formulated with respect
to age, sex differences were analyzed and these preliminary analyses revealed
no significant effect of sex on overall success at the task for Experiment 1, Wald

2(1, N=118) = .002, p = .96 (see Appendix H, Table H.1.).

Analysis of

behavioral data revealed significance sex differences in a few of the behavioral
categories studied. These differences will be discussed in more detail where
applicable (see Table H.2.). Because preliminary analyses did not reveal overall
significant effects for sex or age by sex interaction effects, data for boys and girls
were collapsed together for the remaining analyses.
Success Criteria Justification
Children were recorded as being successful at the task if they were able to
reduce the adult‘s overall chance of guessing correctly to at or below the
minimum expected by chance (i.e., < 13). Fewer than 13 correct guesses likely
represented chance responding due to binomial probability estimates of
performance by chance alone. It was assumed that if the adult was able to
choose correctly 13 or more out of the possible 20 times, then she was no longer
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making random guesses (p < .07) and instead was garnering information from
the child‘s behavior to guide her choices.
Hypothesis 1: Age Differences in Success Rate
It was predicted that 8-year-olds would demonstrate greater
understanding of recursive awareness of intentionality (RAI) and thus would be
significantly more successful at the current game paradigm than would 6-yearolds, who would be significantly more successful than 4-year-olds. Success was
quantified as the child reducing an adult‘s chance of guessing correctly back to
chance levels (i.e., <13 of the possible 20 cards, p < .05). Based on our
analysis, there were significant differences in success rate by age, Wald 2(2, N
= 118) = 10.2, p = .001. A SIDAK post hoc analysis revealed significant
improvement with age for each of the three age groups studied. (See Figure 2
and Table H.3.).
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Figure 2. Percentage of Children Reaching Success Criterion by Age.
Vertical lines depict standard error of the means. All pairwise comparisons are
significant to at least p < .02.
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Overview of Hypotheses 2-4: Behaviors of Interest
A simple count was conducted to calculate the number of children who
demonstrated each of the behaviors of interest. Also, to explore how frequently
children demonstrated each behavior, we calculated how many children in each
age group used each of the behaviors as their predominant strategy (see Table
H.4.). To be a predominant strategy, children had to demonstrate behaviors that
fell into the category on at least 50% of the game trials. Children who did not
demonstrate a particular behavioral strategy on at least 50% of the trials were
recorded as having a ‗mixed strategy‘ meaning that they sometimes revealed
information, sometimes hid information, and/or sometimes gave false cues.
The most salient descriptive differences in the raw data were apparent
within three behavioral categories: explicit revelation of information, attempts at
hiding information, and number of changes in pointing strategy. As shown in
Table H.4., 4-year-olds explicitly revealed information more often than the older
age groups with 78% of 4-year-olds revealing information at some point during
the game and 44% revealing information on more than 50% of the trials. In
contrast only 2% of 6-year-olds explicitly revealed information on more than 50%
of the trials and no 8-year-olds revealed information as a predominant strategy.
Six-year-olds were the most likely to attempt to hide information from an
opponent, with 10% of 6-year-olds using hiding as their predominant strategy
compared to only 3% of 4-year-olds and 0% of 8-year-olds. On the other hand,
8-year-olds tended to rely on flexibly switching their pointing strategy when
providing clues, with 68% of 8-year-olds using changing their pointing strategy as
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their predominant strategy, 51% of 6-year-olds and only 11% of 4-year-olds. No
child exhibited accidental revelations or false cues as a predominant strategy.
Further analyses of each behavior of interest will be reported with respect to the
posed hypotheses in the following sections.
Hypothesis 2: Age Trends in Revelation Behaviors
Explicit Revelations
When behaviors of interest were examined using the Poisson Regression
Analysis, we found significant age differences for explicit revelation behaviors for
the three age groups examined as was hypothesized, Wald 2(2, N = 118) =
329.8, p < .001. A SIDAK post hoc analysis revealed significant differences
between each of the three age groups examined. Four-year-olds explicitly
revealed information (showed the card purposefully and/or verbalized the correct
answer) significantly more than 6-year-olds, who revealed more than 8-year-olds.
(see Figure 3). Statistical analysis results for all behaviors of interest are
summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Mean (SD) Number of Behaviors of Interest by Age
Age

N

(years)

Explicit

Accidental

Hiding

False

# Strategy

Reveal

Reveal

Behaviors

Cue

Switch

4

36

10.30a (10.1)

0.44a (1.3)

0.30a (1.8)

0.08a (0.4)

3.67a (3.2)

6

41

1.10b (2.1)

0.85a (1.2)

1.80b (4.1)

1.10b (1.4)

7.56b (3.6)

8

41

0.30c (0.6)

0.51a (0.9)

0.07a (0.3)

0.68b (1.6)

10.20c (3.5)

Note. Means in the same column that do not share a subscript differ at p < .001
in the SIDAK pairwise comparison.
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Figure 3. Mean number of explicit revelations by age, out of 20 trials.
Vertical lines depict standard error of the means. All pairwise comparisons, p <
.001

Though sex differences were not of primary interest in the current study,
we found a significant effect of sex on explicit revelations, Wald 2(1, N = 118) =
41.7, p < .001 (see Table H.2.), with boys revealing more than twice as much
information than girls, on average (boys x = 4.7, girls x = 2.4). In other words,
girls were more successful at not verbalizing or showing the hidden card to their
opponent than were boys.
Accidental Revelations
Examination of accidental revelations revealed a different pattern of
results (see Figure 4 for an example of an accidental revelation). Though there
were still significant differences by age, Wald 2(2, N = 118) = 6.1, p = .048, post
hoc analysis revealed that 6-year-olds accidentally revealed more information
than 4- or 8-year-olds (See Table 2 and Figure 5), but when this finding was
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subjected to the stringent requirements inherent in the SIDAK correction, this
difference no longer reached significance levels.

Figure 4. Example of Accidental Revelation Behavior.
Camera is from the perspective of the examiner. Child carefully looks at card
and even pointed to the incorrect color in an attempt to mislead the examiner, but
his behavior (not keeping the card hidden from the examiner‘s perspective) had
already revealed pertinent information.
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Figure 5. Mean number of accidental revelations by age, out of 20 trials.
Vertical lines depict standard error of the means. Though there was an overall
significant difference by age, there were no individual significant differences
resulting from pairwise comparisons: 4-year-olds - 6-year-olds, p = .072; 4-yearolds - 8-year-olds, p = .963; 6-year-olds - 8-year-olds, p =.173.
There were no significant effects for sex for accidental revelations (see
Table H.2.).
Hypothesis 3: Age Trends in Attempts to Hide Information
It was predicted that understanding and ability to hide information from a
competitive partner would increase with age (see Figure 6 for an example of
hiding behavior). Analysis revealed that there was a significant age effect for
attempts at hiding information, Wald 2(2, N = 118) = 55.9, p < .001. Post hoc
analysis revealed that hiding behavior did not show a linear increase with age
(see Table 2). Six-year-olds were found to make significantly more attempts to
hide information on average than either 4- or 8-year-olds (see Figure 7). Sixyear-olds used obvious strategies of hiding behaviors, such as hiding their face
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with the card, more often than either of the other two age groups, who did not
significantly differ from one another.

Figure 6. Example of Hiding Behavior.
Child conceals face with card, hiding any information that the partner might gain
from his facial cues.
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Figure 7. Mean number of hiding behaviors by age, out of 20 trials.
Vertical lines depict standard error of the means. Pairwise comparisons reveal:
4-year-olds - 6-year-olds, p < .001; 4-year-olds - 8-year-olds, p = .064;
6-year-olds - 8-year-olds, p < .001.

Though sex differences were not anticipated, there was a significant effect
for sex in attempts to hide information, Wald 2(1, N = 118) = 10.2, p = .001 (See
Table H.2.), with boys making twice as many attempts at inhibiting information on
average than girls (boys x = 1.0, girls x = 0.5).

Hypothesis 4: Age Trends in Fabrication Behaviors
False Cues
Analysis revealed that there were significant age differences in the
number of false cues provided by age, Wald 2(2, N = 118) = 19.8, p < .001. In
line with our hypotheses, a post hoc analysis revealed that 6- and 8-year-olds
were more likely to provide salient false cues to attempt to mislead a partner than
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4-year-olds (see Table 2 and Figure 8). There were no significant effects for sex
for false cues (see Table H.2.).
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Figure 8. Mean number of false cues by age, out of 20 trials.
Vertical lines depict standard error of the means. Pairwise comparisons reveal:
4-year-olds - 6-year-olds, p < .001; 4-year-olds - 8-year-olds, p < .001; 6-yearolds - 8-year-olds, p = .17.

Number of Changes in Pointing Strategy
As predicted, there were significant differences in the number of times a
child changed his/her pointing strategy by age, Wald 2(2, N = 118) = 105.5, p <
.001 (see Figure 9 for an example of change in pointing strategy). A post hoc
analysis showed that 8-year-olds were significantly more likely to vary their
pointing strategy more frequently than 6-year-olds who were significantly more
likely to vary it more frequently than 4-year-olds (see Table 2 and Figure 10).
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Figure 9. Example of a Strategy Switch.
Child won card after switching her strategy from pointing to the correct color to
pointing to the incorrect color.
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Figure 10. Mean number of times children changed their pointing strategy during
the game, out of 20 trials.
Vertical lines depict standard error of the means. All pairwise comparisons
reveal p < .001.
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Hypothesis 5: Developmental Differences in Verbal Report
Based on interview categorization, we found a significant age effect for
verbal confirmation of a developing RAI, F(2, 115) = 29.9, p < .001. Post hoc
analysis showed that 8-year-olds were significantly more likely to have an
awareness of recursive intentionality than 6-year-olds (p < .001), who were more
likely than 4-year olds (p = .001). Cross tabs analysis revealed the directional
and stage-like development of this trait with over half of the 4-year olds showing
no indication of a RAI, well over a half of 6-year-olds showing at least some
awareness, and nearly all of the 8-year-olds demonstrating full awareness of RAI
as measured by this task (see Figure 11 and Table H.5.).
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Figure 11. Percentage of children at each age in each of the three categories of
level of recursive awareness understanding based on follow-up interview data.
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Chapter IV
DISCUSSION EXPERIMENT 1

Results of the present study revealed that there is minimal recursive
awareness of intentionality (RAI) at the age when children typically pass falsebelief tests. Rather, RAI develops throughout middle childhood with significant
differences emerging between 4, 6, and 8 years of age. As hypothesized, results
demonstrated a clear age trend in the emergence of RAI ability as revealed in
several ways, including: 1) a significant increase in the number of children who
achieved the success criterion with age, 2) a significant increase in the number of
times a child changed their pointing strategy with age, and 3) a significant
increase in verification of understanding of RAI through verbal reports by the
child with age. We first discuss each of these findings and then explore other
behavioral data that may also lend insight into how this emerging ability
develops.
Though several trends emerged in the data from the 4-, 6-, and 8-yearolds examined, the most revealing finding that supports a developing
understanding of RAI is that children were increasingly likely to reach the
success criterion with age. To be successful at the task, the child was required
to conceal information from an opponent. The ability to conceal information
required that the child not only be aware of what signals would be informative to
a partner (RAI) but also have the ability to suppress or alter such signals
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effectively. The 8-year-olds were significantly better at achieving this goal than
the 6-year-olds who were significantly better than the 4-year-olds.
As we look more closely at the behaviors that supported this increase in
overall success, two primary behavioral factors emerged. First, the number of
times a child changed his/her pointing strategy across trials (e.g., first pointing to
the correct color then pointing to the incorrect color on a subsequent trial, then
back again) was directly correlated with his/her success at the task. A
substantial increase in the number of changes in pointing strategy emerged over
the three age groups. This increased flexibility of changing the pointing strategy
reveals awareness that the examiner was using repetitions in the child‘s pointing
cue as informative for her guess. Frequently changing the pointing strategy
makes it more difficult for an opponent to gain a strategic advantage in the game
and reveals that the child is aware of this dynamic aspect. On average, the 4year-olds switched their pointing strategy fewer than four times per 20 card set,
the 6-year-olds switched almost eight times, and the 8-year-olds switched more
than ten times (see Table 2).
The second factor that revealed evidence for increasing RAI with age was
children‘s own insight about their strategy as indicated by children‘s
verbalizations about the task. Following the task, children were asked nonleading questions concerning their strategic approach to the game. The results
of this interview provided even more concrete evidence about the development of
RAI across the age groups examined. Verbal responses to questions inquiring
about the child‘s understanding and strategy use during the task were used to
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categorize children into one of three levels: no indication of RAI, incomplete RAI,
and complete RAI. As hypothesized, with age, there was a steady decrease in
the percentage of children who gave no indication of recursive awareness (56%
at the 4-year-old level to 17% at the 6-year-old level to 2% at the 8-year-old
level), a marked increase in the percentage who demonstrated a complete
understanding of recursive awareness (25% to 46% to 93%), and a transient
phase of incomplete awareness that peaked in the 6-year-old age group (19% to
37% to 5%) (See Figure 11; Table H.5). These trends demonstrate the
emergence of a more complete understanding of RAI across these middle
childhood years. Children were categorized based on their performance on the
task as well as their verbal report to follow-up questions. While there were
instances where a child appeared to be using an understanding of recursive
awareness to mislead their opponent yet were unable to verbalize it
(demonstrating an incomplete understanding), there were no instances where a
child could verbalize it without having put it into action, for at least a portion of the
game play. Children appeared to grasp the concept of manipulating their
behavior even before they were able to provide a coherent explanation and this
transitory partial understanding phase was more prominent in the 6-year-old
group. Four-year-olds were more likely to give no indication of recursive
awareness in behavior or verbal report and 8-year-olds were more likely to
provide conclusive understanding of recursive ability regardless of the medium
through which it was elicited. This progression of understanding RAI translated
to the increase in success we saw over the three age groups with only 11% of
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the 4-year-olds reaching the success criterion on the task, 49% of the 6-year-olds
reaching success criterion, and finally 76% of the 8-year-olds performing
successfully at the task.
Other behaviors examined in this study did not show linear development
with age, but examination of such behaviors reveal clues about how RAI may
develop. The 4-year-olds in our sample explicitly revealed information (i.e.,
showed or verbalized the correct answer) much more than either of the other two
age groups. They made fewer attempts to conceal information than the older
groups and thus an adult partner had access to the information that the child had
been instructed to hide. Due to this behavior, it is difficult to comment on 4-yearolds‘ level of recursive awareness because they did not demonstrate the
competitive motivation that would necessitate strategic attempts. We can
comment, however, that even though 4-year-olds are considered to have a
mature theory of mind (TOM), other factors appear to be required before they
can functionally apply such knowledge during a competitive exchange.
More informative were the children who demonstrated awareness of the
need for a recursive strategy yet were unsuccessful in carrying it out. Behaviors
that demonstrated emerging RAI were characteristic of the 6-year-old age group
and were demonstrated by accidental revelation of information, salient attempts
at inhibiting or hiding information, and attempts at providing misinformation.
Unlike many of the 4-year-olds, the 6-year-old group tended to demonstrate an
understanding of the competitive nature of the current design. They showed
visible attempts at hiding information and superficially attempted to mislead their
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opponent. Yet, unlike the 8-year-olds, the 6-year-olds were still more likely to
leak information by looking at, orienting to, or verbalizing the correct answer.
Six-year-olds showed awareness that partners may be using their behavior to
gain information, but they were still very poor at recognizing and concealing such
pertinent behaviors. Where the 4-year-olds could be characterized by explicit
revelation of information, the 6-year-olds showed an increase in accidental
revelations, attempts at hiding information, and generation of false information.
This shows development in understanding of the task as well as the knowledge
that they have the potential to influence a partner with their behavior. However,
even at 6 years of age, children still had difficulty in carrying out these intentions.
Six-year-olds generally attempted to conceal information, but did so with varying
levels of success. For example, one child turned his body all the way around in
his seat in an attempt to ensure that the examiner would not see the card, but by
doing so, he merely put it in the examiner‘s direct line of sight. Also, children
would sometimes carefully conceal the card and then after looking at it, they
would accidentally show it while giving their hint to the examiner.
As children (i.e., 6-year-olds in our sample) become more aware that they
can increase their success by concealing information from their partner, we see
the emergence of salient hiding behaviors. Our 6-year-olds showed a peak of
hiding behaviors consisting of hiding their face with the card or hiding their body
under the table. They demonstrated an understanding of some cues a partner
may use to gain access to private information and they tended to attempt to
suppress or inhibit such cues. These hiding behaviors proved to be a more
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successful strategy for keeping information from a social partner, but they
created choppy and disjointed interactions. For example, children employing
hiding strategies were observed to avoid eye contact, held their bodies stiffly, hid
beneath the table, and avoided verbal communication. These tactics did make
them more successful in the game paradigm than younger groups who did not
demonstrate such attempts, but these behaviors would certainly stand out in
other social situations. It was predicted that inhibition of revealing behaviors
would increase over the age groups examined, but we found that such behaviors
were rare in the 4-year-old group, peaked within the 6-year-old group and then
dropped off again in the 8-year-old group. Therefore, it is likely that this is a
transient strategy as children begin to develop RAI. Specifically, as children
become aware that they are giving away information through their behavior, their
first line of defense is to physically hide such cues. As they become increasingly
able to control their behavior, they are free to adopt more subtle and effective
strategies. Thus, in the 8-year-old age group, hiding behaviors were almost
nonexistent, with children likely adopting more mature strategies and
demonstrating more confidence and more success in their ability to conceal
information through control and manipulation of their facial expression without
needing to physically hide their face or body.
The 6- and 8-year-old groups also demonstrated the strategy of providing
false cues to their opponent, a rare behavior that was virtually absent in the 4year-old age group. Rather than merely inhibiting information in an obvious
manner, the 6- and 8-year-olds began to demonstrate attempts of actively
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fabricating information. By substituting a false cue, older children could
potentially keep the social interaction smooth even while actively misleading a
partner. Such cues went beyond a hiding strategy and attempted to mislead an
opponent through actively creating a false belief. This strategy could be
considered more mature and more effective because rather than merely
attempting to suppress all information with the risk of leaking information through
the eyes or face, these children provided a wealth of false information, among
which, true information would be more difficult to distinguish. The social
interaction would be smoother, with children looking at the examiner and both
cards.
It was originally hypothesized that 8-year-olds would provide significantly
more false information than 6-year-olds, but examination of the behaviors
revealed no significant difference between the two age groups and, in fact, 6year-olds provided more false cues on average than 8-year-olds. One possible
explanation for this unexpected finding may have to do with which behaviors
were coded. Only salient hiding or fabrication attempts (e.g., covering the face
with card or purposeful looking towards the wrong card) were possible to count.
More subtle behaviors (e.g., keeping eyes trained on target card or looking at
both cards equally) may be more mature strategies that were less noticeable and
therefore also more difficult for behavioral coders to count. Thus the 8-year-olds,
again, may have been using more mature strategies than would have been
detectable in the current paradigm. Logically, one who is effective at providing
false information should be able to do so without such cues (e.g., minutely
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glancing at incorrect color before pointing to correct color) looking out of place.
The noticeable, countable behaviors were likely the more immature attempts.
Such behaviors were most noticeable in the 6-year-old group, which is likely the
group that was just learning to employ them. The emergence of such behaviors
by 6 years of age did, however, demonstrate the emergence of recursive
awareness. These children were aware that others are monitoring their
nonverbal behavior and through their actions they revealed awareness that they
have the ability to mislead others by manipulating their nonverbal signals. This is
likely not dissimilar to the adult ability that makes us savvy social competitors.
To interact effectively in a competitive situation, people may need to subtly hide
their true intentions while broadcasting fabricated ones. Six and 8-year-olds not
only demonstrated awareness of what cues may play a role in this broadcast, but
also showed attempts at altering such cues. These attempts demonstrated that
the children have at least a cursory understanding of how a social partner may
interpret the situation as well as the signals given.
As shown in previous research (Feldman et al., 1979; Gosselin, Warren, &
Diotte, 2002; Josephs, 1994; LaFreniere, 1988; Ruihe & Guoliang, 2006; Saarni,
1984), masking rather than neutralization of an emotional expression is generally
a more effective strategy because the interaction remains smooth and the
partner is less aware that something is amiss. Children who competed
effectively in this paradigm shifted their strategy, provided a range of misleading
cues (e.g., looked at correct card sometimes and incorrect card other times,
verbalized correct/incorrect answer) and generally actively engaged their partner
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rather than withdrawing in an attempt to suppress information. This is likely a
product of increased insight into a partner‘s thoughts and beliefs and one‘s
increased insight into how a partner may be interpreting one‘s own thoughts, as
well as increased confidence in one‘s own abilities to keep true information to
oneself and only let out that information which one so chooses.
Though both 6- and 8-year-olds demonstrated attempts at social
manipulation through attempts at hiding informative behaviors and providing false
information, it still remains that 8-year-olds were significantly more successful
overall at the task. As noted previously, the primary difference in the behaviors
of the 6- and 8-year-olds was the flexibility with which they changed their pointing
strategy. Where 4-year-olds were likely to perseverate in pointing to either the
correct card or the incorrect card, 8-year-olds would vary their pointing frequently
enough to decrease its informative value back to chance. Though 6-year-olds
were beginning to use a more flexible strategy, responding when their opponent
started using it to guess correctly, 8-year-olds were anticipating the response of
the opponent and proactively shifting the veracity of their pointing clues. This is
the most mature strategy to mislead an opponent because the point ceases to
have any predictable meaning and thus the child has successfully reduced the
opponent‘s probability of guessing correctly back to chance levels. Furthermore,
interview responses demonstrated that by 8 years of age, children were better
able to verbalize and conceptualize the mental processes necessary to
understand RAI. These increased verbal/cognitive skills likely contribute to
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solidifying their understanding of RAI, even further increasing their chance of
success at the game.
In the current paradigm, gender differences were not anticipated. Despite
that expectation, some gender differences did emerge. Boys were more likely to
explicitly reveal information than girls, with boys revealing twice as much
information on average than girls. Boys were also more likely to show visible
attempts at inhibition of information than girls, with boys making twice as many
attempts at inhibition on average than girls. These gender differences are
interesting to consider. They suggest that girls may demonstrate the awareness
and the motivation to suppress overt telling behaviors developmentally earlier
than boys. They also suggest that boys may use the immature ‗hiding‘ strategy
to a greater extent than girls. These two gender differences taken together
provide suggestive evidence that RAI may develop earlier in girls than in boys.
These differences have potential evolutionary and socialization support if
differing gender roles are taken into account. For example, girls have been
found to be oriented to the faces of others at an earlier age than boys (BaronCohen, 2005). Such selective attention, which orients females to increased
social bonding in preparation for later gender roles, may also serve to promote
increased perspective taking which would directly influence the child‘s ability to
know to keep the card hidden from the sight of the other. It has also been shown
that girls and boys are socialized differently in our society. With cultural pressure
on girls to be nice and helpful as well as evolutionary pressure to read offspring
signals accurately, girls may have added pressure to react in socially acceptable
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ways, and thus have more motivation to be aware of and to effectively
manipulate their nonverbal behavior more convincingly than their male
counterparts. Both sexes were equally likely to pass or fail the task, but their
observed behavior followed slightly different patterns. Whether these differences
are of a motivational nature or developmental nature remains to be explored.
While even most 4-year-olds are considered to have acquired false-belief
understanding and thus have a mature TOM, it becomes clear that such
precursor ability is merely a building block for later interaction abilities and is by
no means the end point of adult-like ability. Once false-belief ability is mastered,
children have the necessary precursor pieces to begin to understand what
another person might be thinking, what another person might be led to think, and
how one‘s own actions can influence the other. Once that is accomplished a
likely next step is the ability to understand how another person may be
attempting to manipulate one‘s own beliefs and how one can use such
knowledge to one‘s own strategic advantage in a competitive social situation.
Exploration of this question will be addressed in the second experiment of this
study. The questions posed throughout this project place the child in an active
role of decoding social information and encoding it effectively to actively compete
in the social world. Without this ability, a child would be merely at the mercy of
the actions of those around him/her and goal directed social interaction would be
stymied.
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Chapter V
INTRODUCTION TO EXPERIMENT 2

The Present Study
In the present study, we propose that there will be age differences in a
child‘s ability to use contingent nonverbal signals to compete effectively in a
guessing game paradigm. In Experiment 1 we were interested in how and when
children used an understanding of recursive awareness of intentionality (RAI) to
influence their social interactions. Experiment 2 addressed how children use an
understanding of RAI to make predictions during social exchanges, or how they
decode the behavior of others.
Inspired by Freire, Eskritt, and Lee‘s (2004) and Schultz and Cloghesy‘s
(1981) testing paradigms, three age groups were given opportunities to use an
awareness of contingency detection to compete more effectively in a competitive
game situation. The game was modified to examine children‘s ability to pick up
on contingencies in a situation in which an RAI (understanding that they can use
a partner‘s behavior to gain insight into their partner‘s intentions) would make
them more effective competitors. We are primarily interested in developmental
differences; therefore, hypotheses were formulated with respect to age. No sex
differences were predicted for this experiment.
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Basic Design
The present study engaged 4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds in a guessing game
paradigm designed to examine age differences in children‘s ability to detect
contingencies that reveal their partner‘s intentions. The game was played with a
deck of cards turned face down and the child‘s goal in all conditions was to guess
the color of the next card in the deck. The examiner looked at the top card and
the child was asked to guess the color based on a clue given by the examiner.
The veracity of the examiner‘s clue was contingent upon her facial expression.
Children who learned this contingency were able to accurately ―guess‖ the color
of the card. The stimuli were presented via video in order to ensure that all
children received a standardized presentation of the contingent facial
expressions (see DVD in pocket).
Children completed Experiment 2 in the same session as Experiment 1.
Based on pilot data with our youngest age group, the two experiments were
designed to be completed in approximately 25 minutes in order to maximize the
child‘s attention to the game. The two experiments were sequenced to minimize
confounding effects. Experiment 1 was always completed first and gauged
children‘s spontaneous strategies before they were exposed to adults‘ strategies
in Experiment 2.
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Dependent Variables
Children in all conditions were rated on how many cards they won. They
were also categorized based on follow up interview data that were organized to
assess their level of awareness of the contingency.
Developmental Hypotheses
According to previous research (Bakti, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright,
Connellan, & Ahluwalia, 2000; Baron-Cohen, 2005; Freire, Eskritt, & Lee, 2004;
Klinnert, 1984; LaFreniere, 1998; Nelson, 1987; Schultz & Cloghesy, 1981)
children are aware and attend to nonverbal signals (i.e., pointing and eye gaze),
from a very early age. Building upon this research, as well as research on other
cognitive skills, such as RAI, that are thought to develop after the age of four, the
following hypotheses were formulated for the second phase of the study:

1. It was expected that 8-year-olds would detect and use contingent facial
expressions to modify their predictions about a partner‘s intentions more reliably
than 6-year-olds who would detect and use the contingencies more than 4-yearolds.
2. It was predicted that the contingency where smiling was paired with trickery
would be more readily learned than the contingency of neutral expression paired
with trickery. This prediction comes from pilot data where smiling while
attempting to trick a partner was very salient to children who were becoming
aware of the informative value of nonverbal cues to make predictions. Therefore,
it was expected that 8-year-olds would use the contingent facial expression
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regardless of which condition they are placed in, 6-year-olds would detect the
contingency between facial expression and intentions only during conditions
where smiling behavior was paired with trickery and 4-year-olds would have the
most difficulty detecting the contingency in all conditions.
3. Because children are aware of eye-gaze from early infancy, it was predicted
that children would be able to use the pointing cues (conditions 1 and 2) as well
as the eye-gaze cues (conditions 3 and 4) similarly when making predictions.
4. Eight-year-olds‘ verbal reports during the follow up interview were predicted to
demonstrate a greater awareness of the contingency than 6-year-olds who were
predicted to demonstrate a greater awareness than 4-year-olds.
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Chapter VI
METHODS EXPERIMENT 2

Experiment 2: Decoding
Participants
Participants were the same as in Experiment 1 and completed
Experiment 2 in the same 25-minute session (see Table 3). Only one child (a 4year-old) was eliminated due to failure to complete any of the conditions in
Experiment 2. The child left the room before Experiment 2 began and refused to
return. Experiment 2 was always run second.

Table 3. Age and Sex of Participants
Age

Males

Females

Total

4-year-olds

21

14

35

6-year-olds

22

19

41

8-year-olds

20

21

41

Total

63

54

117

Materials
A DVD was created for Experiment 2 in order to ensure that each child
received standardized presentation of the nonverbal signals and facial
expressions that were to be used in the game scenario. Four 5-minute videos
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were used, one for each of the four possible experimental conditions. The videos
were shown to the child on a MacBook Pro laptop.
Procedures
Children participated in two of four possible conditions that asked them to
engage in a contingency detection paradigm modified from that developed by
Schultz and Cloghesy (1981). These conditions examined children‘s natural
ability to use a partner‘s facial expression to detect signals of intentionality.
Conditions varied by nonverbal hint (pointing or glancing) and contingent facial
expression (smiling and neutral face) to determine whether some contingencies
are detected and learned earlier than others.
For all conditions, the shuffled deck of cards was placed face down in the
center of a table with a red card placed face up to the left of the deck and a black
card face up to the right. The examiner looked at the top card from the deck and
then provided a hint about the hidden card (either pointing or glancing to one of
the exposed cards on the table, depending on which condition was being run)
after which the child was asked to guess the color (see Appendix B for full
instructions to children).
In this experiment, the veracity of the hint given was contingent upon the
facial expression of the experimenter/actor providing it. For example, in Condition
1, false hints (pointing to the wrong color) were consistently paired with smiling
behavior while honest signals (pointing to the right color) were paired with a
neutral expression. Recognition of the contingency provided the child with
information about the intentions of the examiner and veracity of the hint given. To
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examine whether the medium and salience of the nonverbal hint impacted the
child‘s performance, in half the conditions, the experimenter pointed at the
correct/incorrect card (Conditions 1 & 2) and in the other half the experimenter
merely glanced at the card (Conditions 3 & 4). The truthfulness of the
pointing/glancing cues was similarly contingent upon face behavior.
Children in each age group were randomly assigned to condition 1 or 2
(where the nonverbal hint was pointing) and then also completed either condition
3 or 4 (eye-gaze conditions). Ultimately approximately equal numbers of each
age group completed the four conditions, with the combination of conditions
counterbalanced within each age group, with one quarter of the children
completing conditions 1 and 3, one quarter completing 1 and 4, one quarter
completing 2 and 3, and one quarter completing 2 and 4 (see Table 4).
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Table 4. Children in Each Condition by Age
Point

Glance

Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 Condition 4
Age

N

(smile=false) (smile=true) (smile=false) (smile=true)

4-year-olds

35

18

17

18

17

6-year-olds

41

21

20

22

19

8-year-olds

41

21

20

20

21

Total

117

60

57

60

57

Note. Each child completed two conditions.

A summary of the four conditions is as follows:
Condition 1: the actor pointed to one of the exposed cards to give the child a
hint about the color of the hidden card. In this condition, the actor smiled when
attempting to fool the child and kept a neutral expression when being honest.
Condition 2: the actor similarly pointed to one of the cards. This time, she kept a
neutral expression when attempting to fool the child and smiled when being
honest.
Condition 3: the actor purposefully glanced twice at one of the exposed cards to
give the child a hint about the color of the hidden card. (After looking at the
hidden card, the actor looked directly at the camera and then looked at one of the
exposed cards for about one second, looked back at the camera, and then
looked at the exposed card again for another second before looking back to the
camera and pausing to give the child an opportunity to guess.) As in condition 1,
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she smiled when attempting to fool the child and kept a neutral expression when
being honest.
Condition 4: the actor again glanced twice at one of the cards. As in condition
2, she kept a neutral expression when attempting to fool the child and smiled
when being honest.
The four conditions systematically linked the veracity of the nonverbal hint
(pointing or eye gaze) with a facial expression (smiling or neutral expression).
For each condition, 12 practice trials were designed to provide the child with the
opportunity to learn the contingency. The first four cards alternated between
true/false hints, the second four were all true, and the third four were all false.
Then the next 16 trials were randomly shuffled (8 true and 8 false hints) and this
same random order was presented to each child to assess the child‘s
understanding of the contingency (see Appendix F for Assessment Form).
Following completion of the task, children were individually interviewed in an
open-ended fashion to investigate their strategy for playing the game (see
Appendix G).
In order to establish standardized presentation of the facial expression
and nonverbal cues, a video was created in which an actor, ―Mary,‖ played the
role of the experimenter (see DVD in pocket). Therefore, once children
understood the task and were able to guess correctly on two consecutive honest
practice trials with the examiner, they were asked to watch and interact with a
video monitor while the examiner recorded their guesses. See Figure 12 for
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screen shots of the smiling and pointing conditions and the neutral and glancing
conditions.

Figure 12. Screen shots of Experiment 2 Stimuli

The video presentation was paused only when the child needed more time
to make his/her guess. Otherwise, the interaction between the child and Mary
was fluid and several children believed Mary was actually interacting with them.
If children asked, they were told that Mary was a video recording, like a TV show,
and could not see them. However, a minority remained unconvinced and argued
that she knew when they had guessed. Therefore, the ecological validity of the
study is considered to be high. Children believed they were participating in a
social exchange even when such exchange had been standardized.
Interview Data
In addition to pass/fail information we also analyzed the children based on
follow-up interview data. Based on verbal reports elicited by open-ended
interview questions immediately following the task, children were categorized into
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one of three groups: those providing 1) no indication of the contingency, 2)
incomplete indication of the contingency, or 3) evidence of conclusive
understanding of the contingency. Children who attributed no functional
significance to the examiner‘s facial expression were recorded as having no
awareness of the contingency. These children were still likely to comment on the
salient expressions but would not make functional attributions. When asked
about her face, they would report that she was sometimes ‗happy,‘ sometimes
‗mad,‘ or ‗sad,‘ or ‗ugly.‘ Children who demonstrated awareness through mention
of the facial expression or who spontaneously made inaccurate comments about
the contingency of the facial expression were recorded as having an incomplete
understanding of the contingency. For example, some children verbalized an
incorrect contingency and thus were not able to use it to reach success criterion.
Children who were able to explain the correct contingency were recorded as
having a complete awareness of the contingency.
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Chapter VII
RESULTS EXPERIMENT 2

Analysis Strategy
A number of analytic strategies were used to examine developmental
trends for the dependent variables of primary interest. Due to the mixed design
of between- and within-subject variables, a mixed model analysis was used to
analyze the data (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2000). Preliminary analyses will be
presented first, followed by analyses specific to each hypothesis set forth by this
study. Analyses of differences by age are of primary interest. For ease of
interpretation, figures have been predominantly used throughout the text. For
additional tables, see Appendix H.
Simple contingency detection results
Prior to Experiment 1, children were engaged in a simple contingency
detection task to ensure their ability to detect basic contingencies. All children
were successful in this simple preliminary task and thus were included in
Experiment 2. Before beginning the standardized computer version of the more
difficult contingency detection task for Experiment 2, all children completed
practice trials to ensure their understanding of the game. Practice was continued
until children guessed correctly 2 consecutive times. Most children guessed
correctly on the first two cards given. The greatest number of practice trials
necessary for any child was 5 cards. When children did guess incorrectly, it
typically appeared that they were already anticipating being tricked and were
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attempting to ‗strike first‘ rather than actually misunderstanding of the
instructions.
Sex Differences
Before addressing individual hypotheses that were predominantly
formulated with respect to age, sex differences were analyzed and these
preliminary analyses revealed no significant effect of sex for overall pass/fail on
the tasks in Experiment 2, F(1, 232) = 3.00, p = 0.08 (see Table H.6). Analysis of
individual conditions similarly revealed no significant sex differences (see Table
H.7). Because preliminary analyses did not reveal significant sex differences or
age by sex interaction effects, data for boys and girls were collapsed for the
remaining analyses.
Success Criteria Justification
The criterion for passing the task was defined as children choosing
correctly at least 12 times out of the possible 16 test trials. Fewer than 12 correct
choices likely represented chance responding due to the binomial probability
estimates of performance by chance alone (see Figure 13 for estimates of
chance responding). It was assumed that a child reaching 12 correct has
surpassed chance levels of merely guessing (p = .02) and thus concluded that
they were using the nonverbal behavior of their partner to inform their choices
(see Figure 14).
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Figure 13. Normal Distribution. Expected percentage of number correct choices
out of 16 trials based on chance responding.
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Figure 14. Histogram. Actual percentage of number of correct choices, out of 16
test trials, across all age groups for Experiment 2.

76

Based on probability estimates of performance by chance alone, to
demonstrate an awareness of the nonverbal contingency children were required
to guess correctly on at least 12 out of the 16 test trials. Figure 14 displays
scores that approximately simulate those that would be expected based on
probability estimates for chance performance (as shown in Figure 13). However,
it also demonstrates a second peak reflecting those who were able to identify
and utilize the nonverbal contingency to score beyond the level of chance on the
task. This bimodal distribution likely reflects two populations, the first of which
does not illustrate an awareness of the contingency and approximates the normal
distribution based on chance responding and the second of which reflects an
awareness of the nonverbal contingency and the ability to utilize such
understanding to consistently respond correctly.
Hypothesis 1: Age Differences in Success Rate
In line with our first hypothesis, there was a significant main effect for age
on reaching success criterion, F(2, 112) = 8.8, p < .001. Looking at the SIDAK
post hoc pairwise comparisons for each of the age groups revealed that 8-yearolds were significantly more likely than 4- and 6-year-olds to draw information
from the contingent facial expression when making their choice for all conditions,
with 15% of the 4-year-olds reaching success criterion, 25% of the 6-year-olds
and 53% of the 8-year-olds over all conditions (see Figure 15 and Table H.8).
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Figure 15. Percent of children reaching success criterion by age.
Vertical lines depict standard error of the means.
Hypothesis 2: Contingent Facial Expression
Contrary to pilot data, the contingent facial expression (smile = true or
smile = trick) did not have a significant effect on children‘s performance, F(1,
112) = .11, p = .74 (see Table H.9). Since there were no significant effects of
contingent facial expression, the comparable conditions were collapsed for
further analysis. Specifically, Conditions 1 and 2 varied only by contingent facial
expression. Since there was no effect of facial expression, the two conditions
were combined. Similarly, conditions 3 and 4 varied only by contingent facial
expression and thus were collapsed into one data set.
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Hypothesis 3: Social Cues
The social cue children received (pointing or glancing) had a significant
effect on their performance, with pointing being easier overall, F(2,109) = 12.6, p
= .001 (see Figure 16 and Table H.10).
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Figure 16. Percentage of children reaching success criterion for each social cue.
Pointing was significantly easier than glance over all age groups, F(2,109) =
12.6, p = .001.

Furthermore, no interaction effects were found among any of our
dependent variables (see Table H.11 for summary of significant and nonsignificant findings). Pairwise analyses by age revealed no further significant
results.

79

Hypothesis 4: Developmental Differences in Verbal Report
Based on interview categorization, we found a significant stepwise
increase with age for verbal confirmation of children‘s level of awareness of the
contingency for each age group examined, F(2, 112) = 27.7, p < .001. Post hoc
analysis revealed that 8-year-olds were significantly more likely to verbalize
conclusive awareness of the contingency than either 4- and 6-year olds (4, 6 < 8,
p < .001). Differences between 4- and 6-year olds were not significantly
significant (4 = 6, p = .13) (see Figure 17 and Table H.12).
100
90

Percentage

80
70
60

None

50

Incomplete

40

Complete

30
20
10
0
4

6

8

Age (Years)

Figure 17. Percentage of children at each age in each of the three categories of
level of understanding of contingency based on follow up interview data.
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Chapter VIII
DISCUSSION EXPERIMENT 2

As hypothesized, results of the present study demonstrated significant age
effects for children‘s ability to detect contingencies that provide insight into a
partner‘s true intentions during an ongoing social interaction, as revealed by, 1) a
significant increase in the number of children who achieved success criterion with
age, and 2) a significant increase in verbal verification of the child‘s
understanding of the contingency. There was also a significant effect for the
social cue provided in the various conditions, demonstrating that children
attribute more informative value to some cues than others. We will discuss each
of these findings and explore other data that may influence our understanding of
the development of social contingency detection in children.
An age trend emerged in the data supporting the hypothesis that the
ability to use contingent nonverbal signals to make predictions about a partner‘s
future behavior develops over middle childhood. The 8-year-olds in our sample
performed significantly better than either the 4- or 6-year-old groups. The 8-yearolds were able to use the information provided by their partner‘s facial cues to
alter their own behavior in an effective manner. They were significantly more
aware of the contingency between their partner‘s facial expression and their
future behavior and were able to interpret their partner‘s intentions in the game
paradigm. Many factors likely contribute to this emerging ability, including
experience with competitive situations, increased mastery of perspective taking
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and continued cognitive development. However, the difference in performance
between the 8-year-olds and the younger groups demonstrates that children
have not mastered all aspects of a mature theory of mind (TOM) at age 4, and
that new abilities continue to emerge with development.
The second factor that revealed evidence for age trends for increasing
functional meta-cognitive application of contingency detection abilities was the
child‘s own insight about their awareness as indicated by their verbalizations in
follow-up interview data. Following the task, children were asked non-leading
questions about how they played the game. The results of this interview
provided more evidence about the development of contingency detection across
the age groups examined. Verbal responses to questions inquiring about the
child‘s approach to the task were used to categorize the children into one of three
levels: no indication of contingency, incomplete understanding of contingency,
complete understanding of contingency.
As hypothesized, there was a significant age effect on children‘s
understanding of the contingency in the task based on this interview data (See
Figure 17 and Table H.12.). With age there was a decrease in the percentage of
children who showed no awareness of the contingency (86% at the 4-year-old
level to 70% at the 6-year-old group to 34% at the 8-year-old group), an increase
in the number who demonstrated incomplete awareness (3% to 8% to 11%), and
an increase in the number who demonstrated complete awareness of the
contingency (11% to 22% to 55%). These trends demonstrate that the ability to
use nonverbal cues effectively in a competitive scenario emerges across these
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middle childhood years. As the data show, eight-year-olds were the most likely
to demonstrate complete awareness of the contingency. They conclusively
vocalized that the examiner‘s facial expression was a reliable cue to make
conclusions about the veracity of her hint. These older children were more likely
to see the cause/effect nature of the situation and to respond in a competitive
fashion. Four- and six-year-olds demonstrated awareness of the varying facial
cues (e.g., even 4-year-olds were likely to comment, ―sometimes she was happy
and sometimes she was mad‖ during the follow up interview) but were
significantly less likely to recognize that such cues had informative value and
consequently they were less successful at the game. Though 6-year-olds are not
significantly different from our 4-year-olds, we can see that the trend is in the
expected direction.
It is concluded that the ability to effectively recognize nonverbal behaviors
as having informative value during an interaction requires false-belief mastery as
well as advanced perspective taking skills, contingency detection ability in the
social realm, an understanding of display rules, and the language development to
express such a conceptual understanding of the mind and intentions of others.
When framed in this manner, it is not surprising that our younger groups were
unable to consistently be successful at the task.
Which cue the children received (pointing or glancing) had a significant
effect on their performance, irrespective of age, with more children of all ages
reaching success criterion in the pointing conditions. We know from past
research that children selectively attend to eye-gaze as an informative cue from
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infancy. Therefore, it can be assumed the children in this experiment were
aware of eye-gaze. However, there are several possibilities regarding how
children perceived the eye gaze in the current study. Children may have
attempted to use the eye-gaze cue to inform their choice. However, due to the
competitive nature of the paradigm, it is difficult to predict whether children would
choose the card that the actor looked at or if they would choose the opposite
card. Either card would be a legitimate guess depending on the child‘s
expectations and belief‘s about the actor‘s intentions. The only way to make
conclusions about children‘s strategies would be through interview data, and,
unfortunately, many children, even those who passed the task, frequently had
difficulty giving us a full account of their game strategy. It is also possible that
children may have not noticed the eye-gaze due to their attention on the cards or,
more likely, may not have assigned informative value to it (Bering, 2006). Future
replications of the paradigm may benefit from immediate query of the child after
the first trial (i.e., why did you choose that one?) to see if they are referencing the
eye gaze or merely making a random guess irrespective of the cues provided.
And finally, another possibility for the differential performance might be
that the pointing cue was just more salient than the eye gaze cue, thereby
allowing the children to more readily pick up on the contingency. Not only is a
point a more sizable movement than an eye-shift, but task instructions also
varied between the two cues (see Appendix B for all instructions given to child).
In Conditions 1 and 2, children were specifically instructed that the actor was
going to point to give them a hint. However, in Conditions 3 and 4, children were
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cautioned that the examiner was no longer going to point to the cards and it was
only implicitly suggested that she would continue to give them some type of hint
(i.e., ―watch her carefully and see if you can guess the color.‖). Regardless of the
reason, the pointing cue was more useful for children to predict the color of the
cards in the game. Likely this is a product of salience of the cue, whether it is
through physical magnitude, instructional specificity, or experience with the cue
itself.
Unlike pilot data, varying the facial expression that was paired with trickery
did not affect the children‘s performance. Pilot data had revealed that conditions
where the smile was paired with tricking behavior were significantly easier for all
age groups. It was hypothesized that in the child‘s peer group, trickery is often
accompanied with smiling and laughing behaviors. Based on this, it was
hypothesized in the current study that a smile paired with tricking behavior would
be more salient to the child and that children would demonstrate more successful
contingency detection in such conditions. In the current study, however, children
were able to detect the contingency between a smile and helping behavior and a
smile and tricking behavior at about the same frequency. The current lack of
such a significant difference is surprising. However, children‘s vocalizations
during a follow up interview were likely to include things like, ―I know she is trying
to trick me because she is laughing. When she‘s not tricking me it isn‘t funny‖
and ―I know she is trying to help me because she looks nice. When she looks
ugly I know she is trying to trick me.‖ Successful players seemed able to skew
their interpretation of the emotional signal depending on its contingency in the
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current circumstance. Further research may illustrate whether the smile is an
especially informative cue in the child‘s world or if other emotional expressions
may serve similar purposes.
There is a strong body of literature examining the development of
contingency detection throughout early childhood. From very early in infancy,
infants have an awareness of contingency in the physical realm (e.g., Flavell,
1985; Millar & Weir, 1992; Rovee & Rovee, 1969;) as well as the social realm
(e.g., Baron-Cohen, 2005; Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Rochat, 2001;). This
experiment explored whether children in three age groups (4, 6, and 8 years of
age) could use this understanding of contingency to gain insight into their
partner‘s intentions in a competitive social interaction. We predicted that
children‘s TOM is not mature by age 4, and thus, it was expected that we would
see significant improvements in ability with age. Four-year-olds may be able to
use facial cues and eye gaze to make basic, controlled predictions, but results of
the current study demonstrate that children are unable to decode a partner‘s
intentional state during an ongoing, contingent exchange, even after false-belief
mastery. These results reinforce our position that TOM is not complete with the
understanding of false-belief.
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Chapter IX
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, 4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds
demonstrated that there are aspects of theory of mind (TOM) that are not mature
with false-belief mastery. In Experiment 1, 4-year-old children demonstrated a
lack of awareness of how their own behavior may give a partner access to their
intentions. In Experiment 2, children demonstrated difficulty inferring a partner‘s
intentions even when provided with regular, contingent signals. Both of these
abilities improved with age suggesting continued development of TOM beyond
false-belief mastery. This final section will be concerned with comparison of
these two experiments where possible. It will then discuss the implications of
such results within a larger framework of TOM research. Finally it will
acknowledge limitations and propose arenas for future study.
Due to methodological differences, statistical comparison of the results of
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 was not possible. However, there are several
observations worth noting. Cursory examination of success rate and verbal
reports suggests that Experiment 2 required more advanced recursive
awareness of intention (RAI) abilities than Experiment 1, indicating that these two
paradigms measured different levels of recursive ability. Overall success rate in
Experiment 1 showed that three-fourths of 8-year-olds and half of 6-year-olds
were reaching success criterion. In Experiment 2, however, only about half of
the 8-year-olds reached success criterion and the 6-year-olds were not
significantly different than the 4-year-olds. Furthermore, examination of verbal
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reports during the interview sections of the tasks showed a similar pattern. There
were significant increases in RAI understanding with age for both experiments,
but the rate of improvement with age varied between the two tasks.
When given an opportunity to talk about their strategies to conceal
information from a partner (Experiment 1), one fourth of 4-year-olds could
discuss necessary tactics, some even before they could carry them out to
success criterion. By 6, half of the children demonstrated verbal understanding
of RAI, and by 8, nearly all could verbalize strategies they used to mislead an
adult partner. When given an opportunity to talk about how they could decode
hidden information given by a social partner (Experiment 2), however,
development was not as advanced. By age 4, only about 10% of the children
could discuss how they could infer their partner‘s intentions. By age 6, one fourth
demonstrated such an understanding, and by age 8, still only half could discuss
such recursive strategies. These results appear to lend support to the Piagetian
model that production generally precedes comprehension, as children
demonstrated the ability to use deceptive tactics before they comprehended that
others may employ them (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1993; LaFreniere, 2000).
Development of RAI can be delineated into several levels with increasing
complexity. Children become: 1) aware of their own intentions, 2) aware of the
intentions of the other, 3) aware of the other attempting to perceive their own
intentions, 4) aware that the other may be aware that the child is attempting to
perceive, and so forth. Logically these different levels must succeed each other
in development since one cannot attribute mental states to others that one does
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not understand that one possesses. Children must be aware of themselves as
an intentional agent before they can grasp that the other may have intentions as
well (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1993; LaFreniere, 2000). They must then be aware
that the other has intentions before they can be aware of the other intending to
access the child‘s intentions. Each loop of recursive awareness demands
greater cognitive ability and only the simplest of these, awareness that others
have thoughts and beliefs that may be different than the child‘s own, is present
with false-belief mastery at age four. Subsequent levels of understanding are not
developed by age 4 and emerge throughout middle childhood, with simpler
stages developing earlier than more complex ones.
Experiment 1 required children to form a plan of action, that is to say, to
behave intentionally, and also to be aware that the other may try to discover just
what those intentions are. To be successful children needed to alter their
behavior to actively mislead the other. Experiment 2 required that children
attempt to discover the intentions of the other, and also to be aware that the
other may be changing her behavior to actively mislead the child. To be
successful children needed to correctly read the contingent behavior of the other
to not be misled. This ability logically requires an extra recursive step (the child
taking into account the partner-taking-into-account the child‘s beliefs), which
provides an explanation of why children were less likely to be as successful
during the second experiment.
Children‘s specific behavior similarly demonstrated development, as
behaviors characteristic of children who performed poorly at the tasks were
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different than the behaviors characteristic of children who completed the tasks
successfully. In Experiment 1, the primary requirement was the awareness that
one‘s own behaviors provided information to an opponent. To be successful, not
only did the participants need to be aware of which behaviors provided
information, but they also had to control them effectively. As demonstrated in the
current results, children first attempted to suppress telling behaviors. For
example, it was very characteristic of the younger groups to stare at the card in
their hand and point blindly to the red or the black card, refusing to look in either
direction, effectively suppressing any eye-gaze information. In contrast, older
children demonstrated more confidence in their ability to suppress cues and even
fabricated behaviors to more actively mislead. Thus, they would look at the
wrong card in an attempt to get their opponent to choose that card. They were
aware that the adult was using more than just the pointing strategy to make a
guess and thus they cleverly ‗leaked‘ information in a controlled manner.
Furthermore, unlike in the younger groups where such false cues became
predictable in themselves (e.g., once the examiner learned that the child was
always pointing to the wrong card, she could use that information to make the
correct choice), the oldest group demonstrated the ability to use a mixed strategy
to more effectively mislead the opponent. They would sometimes look at the
right card, sometimes look at the wrong card, and let the information ‗slip‘ in other
ways (e.g., one child said, ―It‘s red. I promise,‖ knowing that the examiner would
think he was lying. Thus when the examiner inaccurately chose the black card,
the child crowed, ―I told you it was red!!!‖). Such strategies only worked once if

90

the child used them consistently, but the most successful children kept changing
their strategy, thus leaving the examiner with no recourse other than a blind
choice.
Behavioral data from Experiment 1 showed clear age trends in the ability
to control and manipulate behavior to maximize effectiveness. First, they
became aware of which behaviors to control, then they attempted to control
them, and finally they fabricated false behaviors. Experiment 2 allowed for
demonstration of similar development when children were required to infer
information from the behaviors of others to compete effectively at the task.
Again, the first requirement would be to recognize behaviors that may be
informative and almost all children referenced and commented on the facial
expression of the examiner, regardless of age. However, in the initial level of
awareness, children commented on these contingent facial expressions but did
not assign functional significance to them. Younger children would comment
that ―sometimes she is pretty and sometimes she is ugly‖ showing that they were
aware of the varying expressions, but they were not using such expressions to
guide their choices. In the older age groups, children began inferring information
from such signals. They would comment, ―I know she is helping me because she
looks nice.‖ Or, ―I know she is tricking me because she thinks it‘s funny.‖ These
children clearly assigned meaning to the facial expression to help inform their
choices. Unsurprisingly, children who were able to infer the intention behind the
expression accurately were also able to consistently choose correctly. This
ability varied with age, with older children identifying the functional value of such
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expressions most accurately, thus allowing them to make significantly more
correct choices in the game paradigm. While even the youngest groups were
identifying the facial expressions, only the oldest groups were inferring intention
from them and using them to their competitive advantage.
RAI is a ubiquitous skill in the adult social experience. Understanding how
one‘s own behavior may be viewed by another and managing it effectively is a
critical component of social competence. Those aware of how they will be
received will be more successful in eliciting cooperation or competing effectively.
One must similarly have awareness of any potentially hidden intentions behind
the actions of others. The inability to accurately interpret the behavior of others
can lead to negative consequences like being taken advantage of in competitive
contexts. Though these skills are taken for granted by the time one reaches
adulthood, their development is not well understood. Many prerequisite abilities
such as contingency detection (Flavell, 1985; Lemelin, Tarabulsky, & Provost,
2002; Lohaus et al., 2005; Millar & Weir, 1992; Rovee & Rovee, 1969), attention
to eye gaze and facial expression (Bakti, et al., 2000; Baron-Cohen, 2005; Harris,
1993; Hood, Willen, & Driver, 1998; Klinnert, 1984; Meltzoff & Moore, 1989;
Nelson, 1987; Pellicano & Rhodes, 2003) and false-belief mastery (Flavell, 1985;
Flavell, 2000; Wellman, 1990; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Woolley & Wellman,
1990) have been thoroughly studied. Now researchers must fill in some of the
gaps between these early abilities and the more mature abilities demonstrated by
adults.
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The present study is one of the first that attempts to investigate
developmental achievements that follow false-belief mastery. We caution that,
while children have made many gains in understanding the minds of others by
age 4, they still are lacking in some very fundamental areas. Specifically, they
may be able to attribute emotion, thoughts, beliefs, or desires to others but they
are not skilled at using these attributions to make accurate predictions for future
behavior and they have similar deficiencies concerning the manipulation of such
beliefs (Friere, Eskritt, & Lee, 2004; LaFreniere, 1988; Schultz & Cloghesy,
1981). These abilities are very likely to begin to develop shortly after the
development of TOM as traditionally conceptualized, whether through
experience, maturation, or a combination of these factors.
The results of the current study support the notion that RAI is not fully
developed with the mastery of TOM as characterized by false-belief tasks and
that it emerges over middle childhood. Based on this and similar research
(Friere, Eskritt, & Lee, 2004; LaFreniere, 1988; Schultz & Cloghesy, 1981),
sequential achievements can be conceptualized. Initially (4-year-olds) there is a
lack of recursive ability characterized by children presenting as seemingly
unaware of what behaviors they or a partner may use to gain access to
information in the competitive situation. Interestingly, this stage overlaps that of
traditional TOM achievement, revealing that recursive ability is not developed
with TOM ability as characterized by false-belief mastery. The next age group
(6-year-olds) demonstrated a growing awareness that was characterized by the
child attempting to suppress telling behaviors. At this intermediate stage,
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children were aware of the most salient behaviors that a partner may use to gain
information and attempted to inhibit them. While inhibition may not be an ideal
strategy, it did allow children to be successful in the game paradigm in
Experiment 1 significantly more often. However, they did not yet show a similar
increase in ability in inferring the intentions of their game opponent in Experiment
2. Finally, in Experiment 1, older children (8-year-olds) demonstrated a more
mature awareness of recursive interaction and began to substitute false cues to
actively mislead a partner. Such a strategy was the most successful because
honest signals were masked rather than suppressed. This oldest group was also
able to infer the intentions of a partner based on nonverbal signals significantly
more often than the younger groups.
This study adds to our understanding of the development of RAI and
shows that there is certainly much left to consider. The interview portion of the
study was invaluable to gain insight into how much the children actually
understood about the recursive nature of intention. However, due to the limited
verbal abilities of the younger preschool age group, they were likely at a
disadvantage when being assessed via verbal report. There is a possibility that
this age group may have had a greater understanding of RAI than they were able
to express after completing the task.
The nature of the task also allowed children to interpret the
examiner‘s/actor‘s intentions in various ways, which may have complicated the
results. Children who were successful at the task frequently interpreted the facial
expression in a way that was congruous with their appraisal of her intentions.
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For example, in conditions where the smile was paired with inaccurate hints,
successful children would verbalize that they knew she was trying to trick them
because she had a tricky smile on her face. However, in conditions where the
smile was paired with true hints, successful children frequently said that they
knew she was telling the truth because she looked nice and helpful and when
she did not look nice, they knew she was tricking them. Therefore,
developmental differences in children‘s abilities to interpret non-social ambiguous
situations could be further explored in an empirical manner that was not
addressed in this study.
Further research could additionally delineate the developments that occur
post false-belief mastery that contribute to an adult-level of social understanding.
As demonstrated by the current results, even by age 8, success is not reached
by 100% of the children. It may be interesting to apply the current methods to 10or 12-year-olds, or beyond, to chart the course of further development of
children‘s abilities to detect social contingencies and to influence the behavior of
others. It would also be informative to gather additional interview data during the
tasks (rather than immediately following) to gauge how children are thinking
about the minds of others and how such interpretation influences their behavioral
output. Also, similar research using a non-socially oriented paradigm may help
delineate between general cognitive developments and TOM developments that
are unique to the social setting. Finally, our current results show that children‘s
understanding of the intricacies involved in RAI are not solidified even by age 8,
with our different tasks revealing different levels of success at each age.
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Therefore, alternate paradigms varying the methods used to target a child‘s
ability to hide or infer intentions in a social setting may contribute to
understanding some of the subtleties in this developmental process.
TOM is a complex ability that is generally considered to be unique to
humans. We are a remarkably social species and our ability to produce and
decode the very subtle social displays that are omnipresent in our social world
must be developmentally supported. The current study suggests that TOM is not
completely developed by age 4 as historically conceptualized in terms of falsebelief mastery. Rather, the abilities that create an adult-like TOM continue to
develop over middle childhood with children demonstrating increasing awareness
of the mind and the intentions of the self and others with age.
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PARENT/GUARDIAN CONSENT FORM
2007
Dear Parents/Guardians:
Your child has been invited to participate in a research project sponsored
by the Department of Psychology at the University of Maine. Rachelle Smith, a
doctoral student, and Dr. Peter LaFreniere, her faculty advisor, are conducting
the project. We are interested in learning about how and at what age children use
nonverbal cues (such as looking or pointing) to make predictions about the
intentions of others. In addition, we are interested in exploring what nonverbal
cues children use to influence a game-partner.
What will your child be asked to do? If you agree to allow your child to
participate, her/she will be invited to play some card games with an adult
examiner during their regular school day. The games involve guessing the color
of the next card in a deck of cards. Children will get to have a turn trying to
guess the next card and a turn looking at the card while the examiner guesses.
The session will take about 25 minutes and will take place in a quiet location in
the school. Children will be provided with simple instructions and then their play
will be videotaped to determine what nonverbal cues they use to help them play.
Regardless of performance on the card games, children will be rewarded with
praise and stickers and will be given an opportunity to discuss how they played
the game.
Will answers be private and confidential? All information obtained about each
child will be private and kept confidential. The information will only be used for
research purposes. Your child‘s name will never be associated with his/her
responses. Your child will be given an ID number and only his/her age and
gender will be recorded. The observation forms and videotapes will be stored in
a locked laboratory room and will be kept indefinitely.
Risks and Benefits: The participation of your child in this study is voluntary.
Your child may stop participating at any point. There is no penalty for a child who
decides not to participate or stops in the middle of a session. Except for your
child‘s time (approximately 25 minutes), there are no foreseeable risks to
participating in this study. The benefits of this research are that we will learn
more about when children begin to use nonverbal signals to predict and influence
the behavior of others. In addition, your child will receive a small token of
appreciation (e.g., stickers, pencil) as well as praise for a job well done.
What do you need to do? Please fill out and return the form on the next page
to your child‘s classroom teacher as soon as possible.
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Contact Information: If you have any questions about your child‘s rights as a
research participant, please contact Gayle Anderson, Assistant to the University
of Maine‘s Protection of Human Subjects Review Board, 581-1498 (or email her
at gayle@maine.edu). If you have any questions or concerns about the research
project, please feel free to contact Dr. Peter LaFreniere or Rachelle Smith at the
address or phone number provided below.
Thank you for your help!

____________________________
______________________________
Rachelle Smith, B.A.
Peter LaFreniere, Ph.D.
Address: 301 Little Hall
Address:
301 Little Hall
Department of Psychology
Department of Psychology
University of Maine
University of Maine
Orono, ME 04469
Orono, ME 04469
E-mail:Rachelle.Smith@umit.maine.edu Phone: 581-2044
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Parent/Guardian consent form for the University of Maine research project on
Development of Theory of Mind after age four conducted by Rachelle Smith and
Peter LaFreniere.
PLEASE RETURN TO YOUR CHILD’S CLASSROOM TEACHER AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE -- THANK YOU!
Please check whether or not your child has your permission to participate in this
study:
_____ My child has permission to participate.
_____ My child does NOT have permission to participate in this study.
Child‘s name: ________________________________________
Gender: M or F (please circle one)
Birthday: ____/____/______
Grade: _______
Number of Siblings: _____________________________
Ages of Siblings: _______________________________
Teacher‘s Name: _______________________________
Parent‘s Name: ________________________________
Relationship to child (e.g., mother, father, guardian): ______________________

Parent/Guardian Signature: _____________________________________
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CHILD (STUDENT) ASSENT FORM
Dear Student,
Hello! My name is Rachelle, and I am a college student at the University of
Maine. Your parents have given you permission to play some different games
that I have brought with me. You will get to play some of the games with cards
and other games on the computer. I think that you will like the games!
After we play the games, I have some little prizes for you! The prizes are
for working hard on the games and I think you can win one!
Do you have any questions?
Will you play the game with me?
1. Experiment 1
Introductory Task:
This is a guessing game. The game is played with a deck of cards. Each
card is red or black (show the cards as you name the color). The game is to
guess the color of the next card in these stacks (point to the two stacks). What
color do you think this card is? What about his one? (Alternate between decks
until the child is able to successfully “guess” the color 6 consecutive times). You
did great! Let‘s try the next game!
A. Play the game.
Next you get to have a turn looking at the cards and I will try to guess what
the color is! This time we just have one deck. You will look at the card and then
point to either the red card or the black card to give me a hint. If I guess right,
then I win the card. If you trick me and I guess wrong, then you win the card.
Remember, try to win as many cards as you can! Okay?
(Video record interactions. Also record number of cards each participant won).
B. Interview
How did you play the game?
How did you win so many cards?
Did you try to trick me/him/her?
How?
(Record all responses on Interview Template 1, see Appendix C.).
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2. Experiment 2
Conditions 1 & 2:
Now it is my turn to look at the cards. Just like before, the cards are either
red or black (point to the cards as you name the color). I will look at the top card
(demonstrate) and then point (demonstrate) to a card to give you a hint about
what color it might be. But be careful! Sometimes I might try to fool you! If you
get it right, you win a chip! At the end, you can trade your chips for some
stickers. Do you understand?
Now you are going to watch a video and play the game with my friend
Mary. Remember to watch carefully because sometimes Mary is tricky!
Conditions 3 & 4:
Now it is my turn to look at the cards. Just like before, the cards are either
red or black (point to the cards as you name the color). I will look at the top card
(demonstrate) and then you try to guess what color it might be. Remember,
watch carefully and see if you can guess what color it is! If you get it right, you
win a chip! At the end, you can trade your chips for some stickers. Do you
understand?
Now you are going to watch a video and play the game with my friend
Mary. Remember to watch carefully because sometimes Mary is tricky!
(Record all responses on Child Assessment Form, see Appendix F.).
B. Interview
How did you play the game?
How did you win so many cards?
She was tricky! How did you know when she was tricking you?
Did you see anything on her face?
(Record all responses on Interview Template 2, see Appendix G.).
Thank you for playing all of my games! You worked really hard! You can choose
5 stickers as a reward for your good work! Thanks again for playing!
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Appendix C.
Interview Template 1

110

Interview Template 1:
Child‘s Name: _____________________________
Childs Age: _______________________________

Date: ______________
Gender: ____________
# cards won:________

How did you play the game?

How did you win so many cards?

Did you try to trick me/him/her?

How?

Mark one:
___ Provides no indication of awareness of intentionality.
___ Provides indication that had awareness of intentionality, but cannot explain.
___ Conclusively indicates an awareness of intentionality.
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Appendix D
Coding of Behavior Template

112

Coding of Behavior Template:
Child‘s Name: _______________________________ Date: ______________
Childs Age: _________________________________ Gender: ____________
Please count and detail each example of the following behaviors:

1. Explicit behaviors (e.g., showing card or verbalizing color) Total #_____

2. Leaked information (e.g., eye-gaze, body orientation indicating correct
answer).
Total #_____

3. Suppression behaviors (e.g., purposefully not looking towards cards, avoiding
eye-contact)
Total #_____

4. Production of false cues (e.g., suggestive eye gaze to incorrect card,
verbalization of wrong answer)
Total #_____
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Behavior Coding Instructions
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Behavior Coding Instructions
Following are the categories from the behavior observation sheet. We can only
observe behaviors, not intentions, so keep it objective – i.e., do not read into the
behaviors, just look and record what you actually see.
1. Explicit Behaviors: Explicit behaviors include any behaviors that
demonstrate that the child is unaware of what behaviors need to be inhibited in
order to be successful at the guessing game.
A. Verbal Behaviors: The child tells the examiner the correct color of the card.
B. Physical Behaviors: The child purposefully shows the card to the examiner.
2. Leaked (Accidental) Behaviors: Leaked behaviors include any behaviors
that give the examiner a clue as to the color of the hidden card. The child may
demonstrate an understanding that such behaviors should be inhibited but the
behaviors are not fully controlled and leak out anyway.
A. Eye gaze: The child‘s eye dart to the correct color after looking at the hidden
card. Instances where the child looks at a card in preparation to point should not
be included in this category. This glance should be quick, unconscious and not
suppressed by the child.
B. Showing Card: The child understands that the card should be kept hidden
from the examiner but is not sufficient in keeping it fully hidden. The child is not
explicitly showing the card to the examiner, but reveals it accidentally. From the
camera angle, it may be difficult to tell if I can see the card or not, but if I guess
WRONG, then you know I didn‘t see it. I will be mindful when setting up the
camera angle.
3. Suppression Behaviors: The child demonstrates an awareness of what cues
the examiner is using to make a guess and makes a visible attempt to suppress
such behaviors. Suppressed behaviors are behaviors that the child is attempting
to control in order to more successfully mislead the examiner.
A. Occlusion: The child holds the card in front of his/her own face in order to
occlude the view of the examiner. The child noticeably looks only to the hidden
card and never to either of the stimulus cards in order to not give any additional
information.
B. Other: Any other behaviors that demonstrate awareness of attempting to not
give off any additional clues. If you come across any, please let me know so that
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we can conceptualize them and add them to this form. As we begin working with
different age groups, different behaviors may emerge.
4. Tactical Strategy: The child demonstrates a strategy as they give hints. For
each card, mark whether or not the child pointed to the correct (C) color or to the
incorrect (I) color as well as whether or not the child was successful in winning
the card (check mark for each card the child won). Then count the number of
times the child switched strategy during the game (e.g., if they pointed to the
correct (or incorrect) card on the first trial and then to the correct (or incorrect)
card on every trial after that, they switched their strategy 0 times.) Also count
and record the number of cards the child won.
5. Production of False Cues:
The child demonstrates the awareness and
ability to go beyond merely inhibiting their telling behaviors and attempts to
produce misleading cues. As we begin working with different age groups, such
behaviors may become more apparent.
A. Verbal Behaviors: e.g., the child says the card is one color and then
immediately retracts it as if they accidentally let it slip to make you think that they
revealed the color, but in actuality it is the other color. These should be relatively
apparent, with the child acknowledging that they were trying to trick you the
whole time.
B. Eye Gaze: The child blatantly looks to the incorrect color in an attempt to
make examiner think they are leaking the information. We can only count these
if they are blatant and we can agree on what we are seeing, so if it happens, I will
try to get the child to verbalize it after the fact to see if they were aware of what
they were doing.
C. Other: As we work with more savvy kids, we will see if any other productive
clues emerge. If you start to see any, please bring them up with the group so we
can add them to the form.
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Appendix F
Child Assessment Form
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Child Assessment Form
Child‘s Name: _____________________________
Childs Age: _______________________________
Correct answer

Child‘s Response
Condition #___

Date: ______________
Gender: ____________

Child‘s Response
Condition #___

Practice Trials
1. Black
(T)
2. Black
(F)
3. Red
(T)
4. Red
(F)
5. Black
(T)
6. Red
(T)
7. Black
(T)
8. Red
(T)
9. Red
(F)
10. Black (F)
11. Black (F)
12. Black (F)
Test Trials
1. Red
(T)
2. Red
(F)
3. Black
(F)
4. Red
(T)
5. Red
(F)
6. Black
(T)
7. Red
(T)
8. Black
(T)
9. Red
(F)
10. Black (F)
11. Black (T)
12. Black (F)
13. Red
(T)
14. Black (T)
15. Red
(F)
16. Red
(F)
# Correct: _____ /16 test trials
Additional Comments/Observations:
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# Correct: _____ /16 test trials

Appendix G
Interview Template 2
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Interview Template 2:
Child‘s Name: _____________________________
Childs Age: _______________________________

Date: ______________
Gender: ____________
# Cards won: ________

How did you play the game?

How did you win so many cards?

She was tricky! How did you know when she was tricking you?

Did you see anything on her face?

Mark one:
___ Provides no indication of detecting a contingency
___ Provides indication that perceives a contingency but cannot elaborate or
explain
___ Conclusively perceives contingency
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Supplementary Tables
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Table H 1. Experiment 1: Success Rate by Sex
Sex

N

% Pass (SD)

Male

64

47a (50)

Female

54

46a (50)

Note: Scores in the same column that do not share a subscript differ at p < .05.

Table H 2. Experiment 1: Mean (SD) of Behaviors of Interest by Sex

Age
Males

N
64

# Changes
Explicit
Accidental Hiding
False
Pointing
Revelations Revelations Info.
Cues
Strategy
4.69a(8.45) .61a(1.24) .98a(3.06) .67a(1.50) 7.27a(4.34)

Females

54

2.37b(5.17) .61a(1.04)

.46b(2.28) .59a(1.16)

7.31a(4.35)

Note. Means in the same column that do not share a subscript differ at p = .001.

Table H 3. Experiment 1: Success Rate by Age
Age

N

% Pass (SD)

4-year-olds

36

11a (32)

6-year-olds

41

49b (51)

8-year-olds

41

76c (44)

Note. Means that do not share a subscript differ at p <.02 in the SIDAK pairwise
comparison.
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Table H 4. Experiment 1: Percentage of Children Who Demonstrated Behavior
of Interest by Age.
# Changes
Pointing
Strategy
56 (11)

Age
4-year-olds

N
36

Explicit
78 (44)

Accidental
17 (0)

Hiding
False
Information Cues
3 (3)
6 (0)

6-year-olds

41

41 (2)

44 (0)

32 (10)

44 (0)

88 (51)

8-year-olds

41

24 (0)

32 (0)

7 (0)

27 (0)

98 (68)

Note. Percentage Demonstrating Strategy (Percentage using as predominant
strategy, i.e., more than half the trials).

Table H 5. Experiment 1: Level of Recursive Awareness of Intentionality During
Follow-up Interview by Age.
Percentage Level of Recursive Awareness of Intentionality
Age

None

Incomplete

Complete

4-year-olds

56

19

25

6-year-olds

17

37

46

8-year-olds

2

5

93
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Table H 6. Experiment 2: Overall Success Rate by Sex
Sex

N

% Pass (SD)

Male

130

27a (45)

Female

104

38a (49)

Note. Scores in the same column that do not share a subscript differ a p < .05.

Table H 7. Experiment 2: Success Rate for Each Condition by Sex
Condition

Sex

N

% Pass (SD)

1

Males

36

39 (49)

Females

24

50 (51)

Males

29

34 (48)

Females

28

43 (50)

Males

33

18 (39)

Females

27

26 (45)

Males

32

16 (37)

Females

25

32 (48)

2

3

4

Note. Sex did not have a significant effect on performance in any condition.
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Table H 8. Experiment 2: Success Rate Across all Conditions by Age
Age

N

% Pass (SD)

4-year-olds

35

15a (37)

6-year-olds

41

25a (43)

8-year-olds

41

53b (50)

Note. Means in the same column that do not share a subscript differ at p <.01 in
the SIDAK pairwise comparison.

Table H 9. Experiment 2: Success Rate by Social Signal
Signal

Pass

Fail

Smile = fooling

33

67

Smile = honest signal

31

69

Note. Social signal did not have a significant effect on children‘s performance
(F(1, 112) = .113, p = .738).
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Table H 10. Experiment 2: Success Rate by Cue
Cue

Pass

Fail

Point (Cond. 1 + 2)

41

59

Glance (Cond 3 + 4)

22

78

Note. Cue received had a significant effect on children‘s performance (F(2, 109)
= 12.590, p = .001).

Table H 11. Experiment 2: Summary of Findings
Independent Variable

df

F

Significance

Age

2, 112

8.780*

.001

Cue (point/glance)

1, 109

12.59*

.001

Signal (smile = true/false)

1, 182

.113

.738

Signal*Age

2, 182

.364

.695

Signal*Cue

1, 188

.615

.434

Age*Cue

2, 109

2.22

.113

Signal*Age*Cue

2, 188

.338

.714

Note. *p<.05
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Table H 12. Experiment 2: Level of Awareness Across Conditions per Verbal
Report by Age
Percentage Level of Awareness
Age

None

Incomplete

Complete

4-year-olds

86

3

11

6-year-olds

70

8

22

8-year-olds

34

11

55
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